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Hidden Costs of Free Patents
LIZA VERTINSKY*
A growing number of companies, including some of the world’s largest 
patent holders, appear to be giving patent rights away for free. These 
companies are making patent pledges, defined here as voluntary 
unilateral promises to the public to limit the enforcement of their 
patents. While these pledges are widely celebrated as socially beneficial 
efforts to mitigate the negative impact of patents on open innovation, 
this Article challenges the conventional wisdom. Just as there is no free 
lunch, there is no free patent. The Article shows that patent pledges can 
sometimes create hidden costs for innovation that the law is not 
currently equipped to deal with. It identifies three ways in which patent 
pledges can create social costs: (1) enhanced opportunities for patent 
hold-up; (2) foreclosure of alternative technology paths; and (3) use of 
pledges to create entry barriers. These costs arise where patent holders 
exploit limitations in the legal framework governing patent pledges 
along with private information about their intellectual property and 
business strategies to act opportunistically. Drawing from other areas 
of law in which similar problems of opportunism occur, the Article 
applies Professor Henry Smith’s theory of equity as a second-order 
safety valve for law to show how these costs could be mitigated through 
limited expansion of equitable doctrines within patent law.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................1380 
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF PATENT PLEDGES ...................................1386 
A. Unilateral Public Promises ................................................1387 
B. “Free” Patents ...................................................................1389 
C. Defensive Termination ........................................................1390 
D. Social Mission.....................................................................1392 
III. PATENT PLEDGES AS INNOVATION STRATEGIES ........................1396 
A. Pledges and Platform Competition .....................................1396 
B. Clean Energy Vehicles ........................................................1400 
C. Patent Pledges in the Cloud................................................1409 
IV. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PATENT PLEDGES ...............................1416 
A. Benefits of Patent Pledges ..................................................1416 
1. Mechanism for Patent Sharing .....................................1417 
2. Lowers Transaction Costs ............................................1417 
3. Facilitates Adoption and Use of New Technologies .....1418 
4. Reducing Patent Litigation Risks..................................1418 
B. Costs of Patent Pledges ......................................................1419 
1. Patent Hold-Up .............................................................1419 
1380 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:6
2. Foreclosure of Competing Technologies ......................1425 
3. Barriers to Entry ...........................................................1429 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR PATENT POLICY ..........................................1433 
A. Revealing Limits in the Law................................................1433 
B. Expanding Role of Equity in Response ...............................1438 
1. Smith’s “Safety Valve” Theory of Equity .....................1439 
2. Application to Patent Law ............................................1441 
VI. CONCLUSION..............................................................................1447 
I. INTRODUCTION
“For every promise, there is a price to pay.”
-Jim Rohn1
Some of the world’s most innovative companies appear to be giving their 
patents away for free.2 They are making patent pledges, defined here as 
voluntary unilateral promises to the public to limit the enforcement of patents 
                                                                                                                     
* Associate Professor of Law, Emory Law School. For helpful comments I would like 
to thank Ted Sichelman, Jonathan Barnett, Janet Frelich, and Jorge Contreras, as well as the 
participants in the 2015 Patent Pledges Symposium held at American University Washington 
College of Law, Timothy Holbrook, Kay Levine and participants of the Emory Faculty 
Colloquium, and participants in PatCon 2016 at Boston College Law School.
Thanks also to Mason Raphaelson for his excellent research assistance. All errors are mine.
1 JIM ROHN, THE TREASURY OF QUOTES 25 (2010).
2 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Opening the Patent System: Diffusionary Levers in 
Patent Law, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 793, 822 (2016) [hereinafter Chien, Opening]; Colleen V. 
Chien, Why It’s Time To Open Up Our Patent System, WASH. POST (June 30, 2015)
[hereinafter Chien, Why], https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2015/06/30/
why-its-time-to-open-up-our-patent-system/?utm_term=.3b8f6133959c [https://perma.cc/K67Q-
98TT] (describing patent pledges as heralding in a “quiet revolution” in which some of the 
largest companies seek to share their patents to support open innovation); Non-SDO Patent 
Statements and Commitments, PROGRAM ON INFO. JUSTICE & INTELL. PROP.,
http://www.pijip.org/non-sdo-patent-commitments/ [https://perma.cc/RWD7-XARY] (last 
updated Sept. 7, 2017) (a compilation of patent pledges made outside of SDOs). Analogies 
can be drawn to the growth in zero-price markets. See, e.g., John M. Newman, Antitrust in 
Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 163–74 (2015) (discussing costs 
of free goods and arguing for a broader antitrust role within zero-price markets); see also 
Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications for 
Antitrust Enforcement, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 533–40 (2016) (examining the welfare effect 
of free goods); Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of 
the Internet’s Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606, 614–20 (2014) (applying 
transaction cost analysis to examine the costs of “free” internet services); Jonathan M. 
Barnett, The Costs of Free: Commodification, Bundling, and Concentration 2 (Univ. S. Cal. 
Gould Law Sch. Legal Studies Working Paper Series, Paper No. 242, 2017) [hereinafter 
Barnett, Costs] (re-examining the “free is good” proposition and suggesting that unpriced 
distribution of information goods may create social costs). 
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without charge.3 The number of patent holders making promises to share their 
patents in areas of rapid technological growth is already significant, with over 
two thousand companies, including five of the ten largest patent holders, 
committed to sharing their patents in various ways.4 New approaches to patent 
sharing continue to emerge, covering a broad group of patent owners and a
growing number of patents.5 While there is no definitive count of just how many 
patents are the subject of voluntary promises to limit their assertion without 
charge, there is no doubt that such promises now implicate broad swathes of the 
patent landscape in some of the most innovative sectors.6 One of the newer 
patent sharing arrangements, the LOT (license on transfer) Network, already 
includes more than half a million patents.7
As the number of patent pledges continues to increase, they remain widely 
celebrated as socially beneficial efforts to mitigate the negative impact of 
patents on open innovation.8 According to the conventional view of patent 
                                                                                                                     
3 See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 546 (2015) 
[hereinafter Contreras, Patent] (describing the characteristics of patent pledges). 
4 See, e.g., Chien, Opening, supra note 2, at 822 (exploring the way in which the patent 
system can encourage diffusion of technology through pledges and other forms of patent 
sharing and discussing different ways in which companies are sharing their patents).
5 See generally MARTA BELCHER & JOHN CASEY, JUELSGAARD INTELLECTUAL PROP.
& INNOVATION CLINIC, STANFORD LAW SCH., HACKING THE PATENT SYSTEM: A GUIDE TO 
ALTERNATIVE PATENT LICENSING FOR INNOVATORS (Jan. 2016), 
https://www.eff.org/document/hacking-patent-system-2016 [https://perma.cc/NHY7-
77YX] (providing an overview of patent aggregators, individual patent pledges, and a variety 
of defensive patent pledges and royalty-free licensing strategies).
6 See Chien, Opening, supra note 2, at 798–801 (suggesting defensive patent licensing 
is practiced by more than half of patent holders and summarizing survey and other evidence 
suggesting importance of diffusionary patent practices). 
7 KEN SEDDON, LOT NETWORK, INVEST IN GROWTH: HOW LOT NETWORK ADDRESSES 
THE PAE PROBLEM (Jan. 2017), http://lotnet.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Introduction-
of-LOT-2.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NQV-LZTF] (providing the basics on how LOT 
addresses the PAE problem); LOT NETWORK, http://lotnet.com/ [https://perma.cc/R4VW-
M94X] (showing LOT Network now has over 100 members and its pledges cover more than 
630,000 patents as of February 23, 2017). 
8 See, e.g., Matthew W. Callahan & Jason M. Schultz, Is Patent Reform via Private 
Ordering Anticompetitive? An Analysis of Open Patent Agreements, in PATENT PLEDGES:
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON PATENT LAW’S PRIVATE ORDERING FRONTIER 151, 15255 (Jorge 
Contreras & Meredith Jacob eds., 2017); Jason Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, Protecting 
Open Innovation: The Defensive Patent License as a New Approach to Patent Threats, 
Transaction Costs, and Tactical Disarmament, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2637 (2012) 
(surveying types of patent strategies and documenting benefits of these approaches); 
Mariateresa Maggiolino & Maria Lillà Montagnani, Pledges and Covenants: The Keys To 
Unlock Patents 2 (Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2615061, 2015) (describing 
role of pledges in “unlocking” patents); Eric Schulman, Working Together To Reduce Patent 
Litigation, GOOGLE PUB. POLICY BLOG (Mar. 12, 2013), https://publicpolicy.googleblog.com/
2013/03/working-together-to-reduce-patent.html [https://perma.cc/P5BH-GL56] (describing the 
LOT Network and other proposals made to the industry to engage in royalty-free cross-
licensing). See generally Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND 
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pledges, they are simply one of many ways in which private actors seek to 
mitigate inefficiencies that patents may create for open innovation, something 
to be welcomed as an efficient market response to patent shortcomings.9 Patent 
pools and collective rights organizations form to reduce transaction costs and 
mitigate concerns about patent hold-up and patent thickets.10 Open-source 
licensing and defensive patent pools are used to protect and encourage areas of 
open-source development.11 Standard-setting organizations are formed in 
response to needs for open standards to support interoperability and 
compatibility in emerging technology areas.12 Patent pledges can be seen as 
adding to this socially desirable menu of private action designed to protect and 
encourage open innovation.13 While patent pledges may well prove to be 
                                                                                                                     
Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 479 [hereinafter Contreras, 
Market] (describing role and prevalence of pledges and proposing an enforcement 
mechanism).
9 For a few of the many examples of private orderings emerging in the shadow of 
patent law, see Jonathan M. Barnett, The Anti-Commons Revisited, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
127, 14164 (2015) (reviewing historical and contemporary examples of private responses 
to patent challenges and suggesting the market can and does respond to mitigate problems 
that patents may sometimes create for innovation); Daniel R. Cahoy & Leland Glenna, 
Private Ordering and Public Energy Innovation Policy, 36 FLA. ST. U. L.J. 415, 452–58 
(2009) (suggesting that market-based reordering of patent ownership may promote efficient 
commercialization in certain alternative fuel energies); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual 
Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1937–48 
(2002); Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1996); Carl Shapiro, 
Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 1
INNOVATION POL. & ECON. 119, 122–29 (2000) (describing an economic framework 
examining how firms address problems of overlapping patent rights); Julie Samuels, The 
Defensive Patent License and Other Ways To Beat the Patent System, ELECTRIC FRONTIER 
FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG (June 10, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/06/
defensive-patent-license-and-other-ways-beat-patent-system [https://perma.cc/5N87-FUM9]
(acknowledging the patent system is broken and innovators must adopt even a non-perfect 
solution in the meantime); see also Chien, Opening, supra note 2, at 795–802. 
10 See Merges, supra note 9, at 1295; Shapiro, supra note 9, at 120–22.
11 See, e.g., Schultz & Urban, supra note 8, at 37–38 (proposing new type of defensive 
royalty-free patent cross-licensing as a way of promoting open innovation). 
12 See, e.g., Joanna Tsai & Joshua D. Wright, Standard Setting, Intellectual Property 
Rights, and the Role of Antitrust in Regulating Incomplete Contracts, 80 ANTITRUST L.J.
157, 159–60 (2015) (examining presumption that incompleteness of SSO contracts requires 
increased role of antitrust regulators in deterring patent hold-up and suggesting that empirical 
evidence is consistent with a competitive contracting process that is responsive to risk); 
Joshua D. Wright, SSOs, FRAND, and Antitrust: Lessons from the Economics of Incomplete 
Contracts, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 791, 79295 (2014) (examining role of standard-setting 
organizations in facilitating innovation). See generally Lemley, supra note 9 (discussing the 
role and nature of standard-setting organizations and implications for IP). 
13 See, e.g., Schultz & Urban, supra note 8, at 30–33 (describing how patent pledges 
are used to respond to threats of patents on open-source innovation); see also BELCHER &
CASEY, supra note 5, at 10, 16–17. 
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efficient ways of supporting open innovation, however, there is a darker side to 
patent pledging that should not be ignored.
This Article departs from the existing literature on patent pledges, which 
focuses primarily on questions of enforceability and often presumes the benefits 
of pledges, to show that these types of “free” promises can create hidden costs 
for innovation that the law is not currently equipped to deal with.14 Some of the 
costs inherent in relying on private promises to share patents as a means of 
ensuring socially beneficial access have already surfaced in the context of high 
profile litigation involving standards for mobile technologies, otherwise known 
as the smartphone wars.15 The smartphone wars reveal the limitations of relying 
solely on an exchange of private promises to make patents available on fair, 
reasonable and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms as a mechanism for ensuring 
efficient access to industry-wide technology standards.16 Opportunistic use, and 
abuse, of FRAND commitments have triggered review of pledges made in the 
context of standard setting by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), as well as advisory statements from the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).17 These agency reviews have remained 
narrowly focused on FRAND licensing, however, neglecting to consider the 
broader implications of a growing industry practice of patent pledges and related 
                                                                                                                     
14 See Contreras, Market, supra note 8, at 482–84; Catharina Maracke & Axel Metzger, 
Playing Nice With Patents: Do Voluntary Non-Aggression Pledges Provide a Sound Basis 
for Innovation?, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 483, 489–94 (2016) (providing overview of benefits).
But see Barnett, Costs, supra note 2, at 2 (suggesting that unpriced distribution of 
information goods may create social costs). See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, The Host’s
Dilemma: Strategic Forfeiture in Platform Markets for Informational Goods, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1861 (2011) [hereinafter Barnett, Host’s] (examining potential issues with strategic 
forfeiture of IP in platform competition).
15 See, e.g., Michael Carrier, A Roadmap to the Smartphone Patent Wars and FRAND 
Licensing, 2 CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 2–5 (2012) (providing overview of the litigation 
and the IP and antitrust issues involved).
16 See, e.g., Raymond Millien, The Smart Phone Patent Wars: What the FRAND is 
Going On?, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/27/the-smart-
phone-patent-wars-what-the-frand-is-going-on/id=23635/ [https://perma.cc/M9CZ-7ZVB]
(examining the FRAND licensing terms SSOs require of their participants); Smart-Phone 
Lawsuits: The Great Patent Battle, ECONOMIST (Oct. 21, 2010), https://www.economist.com/
node/17309237#footnote1 [https://perma.cc/E7FJ-T3SV] (considering the likelihood that smart 
phone lawsuits are here to stay).
17 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY 
STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY 
F/RAND COMMITMENTS (2013) [hereinafter DOJ & PTO], https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/atr/legacy/2014/09/18/290994.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5MC-Z446] (issuing a 
statement on proper procedure when a patent holder seeks remedy that is encumbered by a 
FRAND licensing commitment); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Charges 
Qualcomm with Monopolizing Key Semiconductor Device Used in Cell Phones (Jan. 17, 
2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/01/ftc-charges-qualcomm-
monopolizing-key-semiconductor-device-used [https://perma.cc/6US3-FGFT] (alleging, among 
other things, that Qualcomm has refused to license standard essential patents despite FRAND 
commitments). 
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defensive cross-licensing practices on competition and innovation.18 This 
Article focuses on the neglected subset of patent pledges that are made outside 
of formal standard setting, where costs, if any, remain hidden or ignored. But 
the arguments made have application to a broad arena of promises to share 
patents or otherwise limit the assertion of patents, including those made in 
standard-setting contexts.
This Article identifies three types of social welfare costs that patent pledges 
can sometimes create: (1) enhanced opportunities for patent hold-up; (2) 
foreclosure of alternative technology paths; and (3) the creation of barriers to 
entry. These costs arise where patent holders exploit limitations in the legal 
framework governing patent pledges along with private information about their 
intellectual property, technology and business strategies to act opportunistically 
at the expense of other technology developers and technology users.19 Where 
this opportunistic use of pledges results in the foreclosure or deterred entry of 
better or ultimately cheaper technologies and/or the extraction of supranormal 
rents from innovators, the social welfare costs are likely to exceed any private 
benefits accrued by those making the patent pledges.20 In the absence of ways 
to sort desirable from undesirable uses of patent pledges, such opportunistic uses 
have the further disadvantage of undermining trust and increasing uncertainty 
in all uses of patent pledges.21
Finding an effective way of responding to these costs through a change in 
patent law or some other body of law is challenging because the types of 
behavior that generate the costs are varied, changeable, hard to predict, and 
difficult to disentangle from desirable behavior ex ante.22 There will be 
inevitable gaps in any set of legal rules, but the costs associated with these gaps 
are often evident only after private actors have exploited the gaps in socially 
                                                                                                                     
18 See generally DOJ & PTO, supra note 17.
19 See Henry E. Smith, Property as Platform: Coordinating Standards for 
Technological Innovation, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1057, 1062 (2013) [hereinafter 
Smith, Property] (applying information theory of property to standard-setting organizations 
and showing how opportunism becomes possible because of property/intellectual property 
separation and specialization). 
20 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 8 (2007) 
[hereinafter DOJ & FTC, ENFORCEMENT], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
reports/antitrust-enforcement-and-intellectual-property-rights-promoting-innovation-and-
competition-report.s.department-justice-and-federal-trade-commission/p040101promoting
innovationandcompetitionrpt0704.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZA2-TN7Q] (“Although both 
cross-licensing and patent-pooling agreements have the potential to generate significant 
efficiencies, they also may generate anticompetitive effects if the arrangements result in price 
fixing, coordinated output restrictions among competitors, or foreclosure of innovation.”); 
see also Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 6–10 (Oct. 22, 2010) 
[hereinafter Smith, Economic] (unpublished manuscript), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area
/workshop/leo/document/HSmith_LawVersusEquity7.pdf [https://perma.cc/HF3V-6F5M].
21 See Chien, Opening, supra note 2, at 813.
22 Smith, Economic, supra note 20, at 6–10.
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costly ways.23 Drawing from other areas of law in which similar problems of 
opportunism occur, this Article applies Professor Henry Smith’s theory of 
equity as a second-order safety valve for law to show how at least some of the 
costs of patent pledges could be mitigated.24 The Article concludes that, rather 
than seeking ex ante changes in patent law, the potential costs of patent pledges 
could be reduced and the benefits enhanced through limited expansion of 
equitable doctrines within patent law to deter opportunism.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II identifies characteristics that many
patent pledges share that, when taken together, create a distinctive form of 
private ordering of patents. Part III provides two examples of industries where 
patent pledges that have these characteristics are being used as innovation 
strategies. Part IV identifies some of the benefits of these patent pledges that 
make them appear to be attractive and even socially desirable innovation 
strategies. It then outlines three types of underappreciated costs that they could 
create for innovation and provides examples drawn from the industry settings 
described in Part III to illustrate how such costs might arise. Part V highlights 
the limitations of the current legal framework to address these costs and suggests 
ways in which a greater use of equitable doctrines within patent law could 
mitigate them. The discussion has implications that extend beyond patent 
pledges to other private orderings designed to open up patents in the name of 
open innovation.25 The Article concludes that there’s no such thing as a free 
patent,26 and that patent policymakers therefore need to be responsive not just 
to the changing ways in which patents are used, but also to the changing ways 
in which patents are “not used.”
                                                                                                                     
23 See id. at 8, 23–24. 
24 See id. at 17–51 (providing a functional motivation for equity as a way of addressing 
the problem of opportunism in ways that support the operation of law); see also Smith, 
Property, supra note 19, at 1078–81 (describing how equity as a safety valve can serve as 
an anti-opportunism device that can mitigate opportunism in standard-setting context). See 
generally Henry E. Smith, Equity as Second-Order Law: The Problem of Opportunism
(Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 15-13, 2015) [hereinafter Smith, Equity],
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2617413 [https://perma.cc/QCT6-HVTB] (describing theory of 
equity as second order safety valve for dealing with the problem of opportunism).
25 Chien, Why, supra note 2 (commenting on private companies strategic use of the 
patent system to include, rather than exclude, which boosts “freedom to operate and 
dissemination of their own ideas”). 
26 This is a play on Friedman’s well-known statement that there’s no such thing as a 
free lunch. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH
(Open Court Publishing Co. 1975). 
1386 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:6
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF PATENT PLEDGES
“Promises are the uniquely human way of ordering the future . . . .”
–Hannah Arendt27
Patent pledges are defined here as voluntary unilateral promises to the 
public to limit the enforcement of specified patents.28 To borrow from a widely 
used general definition of pledges: 
These patent pledges share several key characteristics: they are commitments 
made voluntarily by patent holders to limit the enforcement or other 
exploitation of their patents. They are made not to direct contractual 
counterparties, but to the public at large, or at least to large segments of certain 
markets. And they are made without any direct compensation or other 
consideration.29
These pledges provide assurances to parties interested in using patented 
technologies that the patent owner will not sue them for infringement of the 
pledged patents provided that they comply with the terms of the promise. 
Beyond this basic definition, patent pledges can take on a wide variety of forms, 
ranging from pledges that take place within formal standard-setting 
organizations to informal unilateral promises made by patent owners on blogs 
or in other public forums.30 While much of the legal analysis and policy 
discussion about patent pledges involve pledges made within a formal standard-
setting process or patent pooling organization, the relatively ignored pledges 
made outside of these institutions continue to grow in number and impact.31 It 
is this latter group of pledges and their potential impact on innovation that are 
the focus of this Article. This Part II identifies core characteristics that many of 
these patent pledges share and explores how these characteristics make this 
subset of pledges similar to, and different from, other patent arrangements.
In the most basic sense many patent pledges occurring outside of formal 
standard-setting arrangements are simply unilateral offers of royalty-free cross-
                                                                                                                     
27 HANNAH ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 92 (1972).
28 See Contreras, Patent, supra note 3, at 546.
29 See id. (footnote omitted).
30 See Chien, Opening, supra note 2, at 800 (“Unilateral public patent pledges . . . can 
be implemented flexibly—by announcement, blog post, or other informal mechanism . . . .”); 
Contreras, Patent, supra note 3, at 564 (“Patent pledges come in a wide variety of shapes 
and sizes, from uniform, check-the-box forms to free-style blog postings, press releases and 
oral statements.”).
31 There is a small amount of literature on pledges made outside of formal standard 
setting, but this literature still remains heavily focused on pledges made in connection with 
standards and does little to explore the potential costs of pledges. See Contreras, Patent,
supra note 3, at 546–47, 547 n.12 (summarizing recent literature on standards-related 
pledges made outside of formal standard setting).
2017] HIDDEN COSTS OF FREE PATENTS 1387
licensing or patent non-assertion32, thus falling under existing antitrust and 
intellectual property guidelines governing such intellectual property 
arrangements.33 But patent pledges have a unique combination of characteristics 
that makes them a particularly flexible and low cost way of achieving cross-
licensing or mutual non-assertion in ways that may not have been contemplated 
when these agency guidelines were developed. They allow companies to 
unilaterally commit to limit patent assertion in privately tailored ways to further 
private interests with no guarantee that the results will improve, or at least not 
harm, social welfare.34
I argue that despite the variety of forms that they take, many of the patent 
pledges occurring outside of formal standard-setting arrangements share four 
characteristics that make them useful, although not always socially beneficial, 
innovation strategies.35 The patent pledges in this subset are: (A) unilateral 
public promises (B) to limit the assertion of specified patents without charge,
(C) subject to defensive termination in response to patent infringement suits and 
(D) associated with a social mission that is either directly or indirectly tied to 
open innovation. These four characteristics are discussed in greater detail below,
and the subsequent analysis applies primarily to those patent pledges that share 
all four of these characteristics.
A. Unilateral Public Promises
These patent pledges are made voluntarily and unilaterally by patent 
pledgors to the public. Often the pledges are made on company blogs or through 
company press releases or statements to the media.36 Patent pledges can be as 
simple as a public announcement at a press conference, a web blog entry, or a 
Facebook posting, stating that the patent holder will not initiate patent lawsuits 
against anyone who uses their patented technology.37 This is the approach taken 
by Tesla’s CEO Elon Musk, who promises in a blog that “Tesla will not initiate 
patent lawsuits against anyone who, in good faith, wants to use our 
technology.”38 Patent pledges can also be highly detailed and formalized, 
                                                                                                                     
32 Contreras, Patent, supra note 3, at 570 (referring to pledges as “predominantly non-
assertion or royalty-free licensing commitments”).
33 See DOJ & FTC, ENFORCEMENT, supra note 20, at 87–91 (examining variety of 
intellectual property practices and their likely impact on competition); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
& FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 8–9 (1995) [hereinafter DOJ & FTC, GUIDELINES] (providing guidelines for 
analyzing the antitrust effects of different IP arrangements).
34 See Barnett, Host’s, supra note 14, at 1925–26; 
35 For an example of alternative taxonomy, see Contreras, Patent, supra note 3, at 547–
48.
36 See id. at 570–72. 
37 See, e.g., id. at 571–72. 
38 Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong to You, TESLA: BLOG (June 12, 2014), 
https://www.tesla.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-to-you [https://perma.cc/E29H-TKCQ]. For 
more discussion on this patent pledge see infra Part III.
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specifying patents covered, types of uses permitted, duration, and even a process 
for formalizing the promise.39 Microsoft makes patent pledges that are similar 
in format to its online software licenses, with carefully defined terms and fields 
of use delineating its promise not to assert select patents.40 Technology startup 
Blockstream’s patent pledge takes the form of a commitment to provide its 
current and future patents under the terms of the Defensive Patent License, a 
patent license designed to be the patent equivalent of the well-known open-
source GPL copyright license.41
These patent pledges are made without prior negotiation or coordination 
with other patent holders or users, and they can be and often are communicated 
through widely accessible mediums at low cost.42 Pledges are frequently short 
and informal, leaving out most of the details that would normally go into a 
licensing agreement.43 No negotiation is required or expected, although a few 
of the pledges require the recipient to enter into a subsequent written license 
agreement.44 Toyota’s patent pledge, for example, requires interested users of 
its hydrogen fuel cell patents to take the further step of entering into a license 
with Toyota.45
Many of the pledges, such as IBM’s promise not to assert specified patents 
against developers and users of open-source software and Tesla’s promise not 
to assert its patents against anyone who in good faith wants to use their electric 
vehicle technology, are made to the public at large.46 Others are announced to 
the public but limited in scope to distinct categories of users. Toyota specifies 
particular groups of users in its pledge of patents covering hydrogen fuel cell 
technology.47 Twitter’s patent pledge takes the form of a promise not to assert 
patents issued to its employees without their permission.48 Airbnb joins a group 
                                                                                                                     
39 See, e.g., Microsoft Patent Pledge for Open Source Developers, MSDN,
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecifications/dn646762.aspx#MIPledge 
[https://perma.cc/Y7PG-4XRT].
40 Id.; see also Contreras, Patent, supra note 3, at 570. 
41 Schultz & Urban, supra note 8, at 38–39. Blockstream provides technology important 
to financial networks as well as to many other areas where Blockstream’s sidechain 
technology has application. See Patent Pledge, BLOCKSTREAM, https://blockstream.com/about/
patent_pledge/ [https://perma.cc/69DL-8AFC].
42 See, e.g., Musk, supra note 38.
43 See, e.g., id.; see also Contreras, Market, supra note 8, at 508. 
44 See, e.g., Toyota Opens the Door and Invites the Industry to the Hydrogen Future,
TOYOTA (Jan. 5, 2015), http://corporatenews.pressroom.toyota.com/releases/toyota+fuel+cell+
patents+ces+2015.htm [https://perma.cc/6RQP-ZD2K] [hereinafter Toyota Opens].
45 Id.
46 IBM Statement of Non-Assertion of Named Patents Against OSS, IBM CORP. (Jan.
11, 2005), https://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/pledgedpatents.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VM2W-5RTW]; Musk, supra note 38.
47 Toyota Opens, supra note 44.
48 Adam Messinger (@adam_messinger), Introducing the Innovator’s Patent 
Agreement, TWITTER: BLOG (Apr. 17, 2012), https://blog.twitter.com/2012/introducing-the-
innovator-s-patent-agreement [https://perma.cc/8YA4-9J7B].
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of other companies in making the Patent Pledge, a promise not to assert patents 
against small companies.49
While their format and the ways in which they are communicated diverge, 
the decentralized, unilateral, privately tailored nature of patent pledges 
distinguishes them from many of the other private arrangements controlling the 
use of patents by patent holders. The fact that the pledge is made unilaterally 
leaves the design of the pledge and the medium in which it is made solely in the 
hands of the patent owner.50 There is no required standardization, no negotiation 
over terms, and the pledgor has control over the format and terms of the 
pledge.51 This can be contrasted with other mechanisms for making patents 
available to the public, such as patent pools, collective rights organizations, and 
even patent pledges made within the confines of a standard-setting organization, 
all of which involve a commitment to standardized terms that have been 
negotiated and adopted by the group.52 To pass antitrust muster, these groups 
typically need to allow for relatively open industry participation and access and 
they are designed with antitrust concerns in mind.53
B. “Free” Patents
These patent pledges are gratuitous promises to limit the assertion of the 
pledged patents in specified ways.54 In many but not all cases, the promise is for 
royalty-free use of the patents.55 This approach to sharing patents can be 
contrasted with alternatives of relinquishing control of the patent by putting it 
into the public domain and decisions not to apply for patents in the first place.56
It can also be contrasted with traditional royalty-free cross-licensing 
arrangements, in which parties bargain over their exchange of promises and 
assume ongoing obligations to each other.57 Here, by contrast, the patent owner 
retains control over the patent and there is no negotiation over terms of the 
                                                                                                                     
49 PATENT PLEDGE, http://www.thepatentpledge.org/ [https://perma.cc/J8XF-M7BZ].
50 See Chien, Opening, supra note 2, at 800 (“Unilateral public patent pledges . . . can 
be implemented flexibly—by announcement, blog post, or other informal mechanism . . . .”); 
Contreras, Market, supra note 8, at 508. 
51 See Contreras, Market, supra note 8, at 508.
52 See Tsai & Wright, supra note 12, at 159–60 (discussing the role of standard-setting 
organizations); see also Contreras, Market, supra note 8, at 493–97.
53 See Contreras, Patent, supra note 3, at 588. 
54 See id. at 546, 588. 
55 See id. at 557. 
56 See Clark D. Asay, A Case for the Public Domain, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 753, 798–805 
(2013) (arguing that the best way to support open innovation communities is to enable strong 
public domain dedication).
57 See T. Randolph Beard & David L. Kaserman, Patent Thickets, Cross-Licensing, and 
Antitrust, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 345, 354 (2002) (describing the role and use of cross-
licensing).
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license, but the royalty is set to zero and there is no monetary fee attached to the 
pledge.58
The pledge is thus a mechanism for making the pledged patents readily and 
freely available to interested users of the patented technology without 
relinquishing control over, or the expense of maintaining, the patents.59 But why 
are the pledges royalty-free? Some patent pledges may simply be private efforts 
to open up patents for public use in the absence of statutory “open” patent 
options.60 Others may reflect strategic pricing or forfeiture decisions designed 
to encourage technology adoption and use.61 The allure associated with things 
that appear to be free may increase the market impact of these pledges by 
making technology paths associated with “free” patents appear more attractive 
than justified by the pledged technology.62 Strategic reasons for choosing a zero 
pricing strategy for patents are further explored in Part II and Part III.
C. Defensive Termination 
While these patent pledges are royalty-free, they are not free of strings. 
Almost all of these patent pledges include some kind of defensive provision that 
suspends or terminates the patent license provided by the pledgor upon the 
occurrence of certain triggering events such as the threat or initiation of a patent 
infringement suit against the pledgor by the beneficiary of the pledge.
The basic idea behind defensive uses of patents such as this is to deter patent 
infringement suits with the threat of a counter-suit for patent infringement.63 In 
the context of standard setting, many patent licensing commitments include a 
defensive suspension provision that permits the licensor to suspend the license 
to the pledged patents if the licensee takes specified actions such as threatening 
                                                                                                                     
58 See Contreras, Patent, supra note 3, at 545.
59 See id.
60 See, e.g., Chien, Why, supra note 2 (arguing for creating one or more open patent 
options that would allow inventors to share technology broadly while retaining rights); see 
also Chien, Opening, supra note 2, at 824–44 (claiming that innovation by diffusion is 
happening less than is socially optimal and arguing that patent law’s traditional focus on 
exclusion needs to change to accommodate ways in which patents can better support the 
diffusion of technology through mechanisms such as disclosure, transfer, waiver, and the 
pursuit of freedom to operate).
61 For a discussion of strategic forfeiture of IP in platform markets, see, for example, 
Barnett, Host’s, supra note 14, at 1887–90 (showing why platform holders may voluntarily 
forfeit valuable intellectual assets to encourage adoption and use of their platform), and
Contreras, Patent, supra note 3, at 583–86. 
62 See, e.g., Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 528–31 (discussing studies illustrating 
the behavioral impact of offering something for free).
63 See, e.g., Jason Schultz, Protecting Open Innovation: The Defensive Patent License 
as a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Disarmament, 26 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2012) (discussing the need for defensive use of patents to support 
open innovation).
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or bringing a patent infringement lawsuit against the patent pledgor.64 The 
subset of pledges that are the focus of this Article include similar defensive 
termination provisions that suspend or terminate the patent license provided by 
the pledge to any party that asserts or is involved in the assertion of patents 
against the pledgor or, in some cases, against other parties the pledgor wants to 
protect.65 The patents are free only so long as the party using the patents does 
not turn around and threaten to assert or assert any of its own patents in specified 
ways.66 Some defensive provisions extend even more broadly to encompass 
parties that, while not directly asserting patents, nonetheless profit from patent 
assertion against the pledgor.67
The pledge provides the patent holder with an easy way of signaling the 
likelihood of a return patent infringement suit against any users of the inventions 
covered by the pledged patents. Since there are alternative ways of engaging in 
defensive cross-licensing, this raises the question of how pledges diverge from 
alternatives.68 Many defensive patenting strategies involve centralized efforts 
such as the formation of a patent pool.69 Large scale defensive strategies include 
the organized pooling of patents for defensive purposes that characterizes the 
Open Invention Network70 and the Patent Commons,71 as well as the practices 
of large private patent aggregators such as RPX Corporation72 and Allied 
Security Trust.73 In contrast to these centralized pooling approaches to defensive 
patent use, patent pledges offer a decentralized alternative. While there is no
                                                                                                                     
64 See, e.g., STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PATENT POLICY MANUAL 62–67 (Jorge L. 
Contreras ed., 2007).
65 See Contreras, Patent, supra note 3, at 545 n.6; see, e.g., Open Patent Non-Assertion 
Pledge, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/patents/opnpledge/ [https://perma.cc/9DZG-4HDG]. 
66 See Contreras, Patent, supra note 3, at 545 n.6.
67 See Schultz & Urban, supra note 8, at 55.
68 See generally Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The New Complex 
Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010) 
(discussing growing defensive use of patents and consequences of the emergence of a 
secondary market for those patents); Colleen V. Chien, Race to the Bottom, 51 INTELL. ASSET 
MGMT. MAG., Jan./Feb. 2012 (discussing defensive patent arms race, consequences, and 
possible responses); Michael Loney, The Options for Alternative Patent Licensing 
Compared, MANAGING INTELL. PROP. (June 10, 2014), 
http://www.managingip.com/Article/3350401/The-options-for-alternative-patent-licensing-
compared.html [https://perma.cc/QJ89-CAGM] (providing an overview of the alternative 
patent licensing models that have emerged).
69 See Schultz & Urban, supra note 8, at 34–35.
70 About OIN, OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/about-
us/ [https://perma.cc/VBE7-ZUEL].
71 See, e.g., The Project, PAT. COMMONS PROJECT, http://www.patent-commons.org
[https://perma.cc/PB4E-VRGH]. See generally BELCHER & CASEY, supra note 5 (providing an 
overview of RPX, Allied Security Trust, and the Open Innovation Network).
72 Loney, supra note 68; see also The RPX Network, RPX, http://www.rpxcorp.com/rpx-
network/ [https://perma.cc/DBK3-LKX3].
73 About Us, ALLIED SEC. TR., http://www.ast.com/about-us/asts-mission/
[https://perma.cc/B4P2-7JW5]; Loney, supra note 68.
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precise count of how many individualized patent pledges have been made, one 
database hosted by a university includes a list of almost 200 patent pledges, a 
number of which include defensive termination provisions.74
Pledges can either create their own defensive provisions or rely on a 
standardized form of cross-licensing such as the model provided by the 
Defensive Patent License in either its “sticky” and “non-sticky” forms.75 One of 
the newest defensive licensing strategies, the LOT (License on Transfer)
Network, focuses on royalty-free cross-licenses that are triggered by certain 
kinds of patent transfer.76 The LOT Network was launched by an industry group 
that includes Google, Canon, Dropbox, and SAP as a way of ensuring that 
transferred patents are subject to royalty-free patent cross licensing, and the 
LOT Network now includes over 630,000 patent assets.77 Some of the largest 
patent pledgors, such as Google and IBM, form and join defensive patent pools 
and use standardized defensive licensing strategies in addition to making 
individual patent pledges.78
The growing role of patents as defensive shields to infringement suits marks 
a change from the traditional functions of, and justifications for, patents, yet the 
effects of both large, coordinated efforts to use patents defensively and 
decentralized defensive patent promises and agreements remain poorly 
understood.79 Some of the potential consequences of this growth in defensive 
patent pledging are further explored in Part III.
D. Social Mission 
A close connection between pledges and an announced mission or social 
purpose tied to open innovation further distinguishes this subset of pledges.
These pledges are promoted as and tailored around the advancement of “open 
innovation,”80 either as a goal in itself or as a means of promoting some other 
                                                                                                                     
74 See Non-SDO Patent Statements and Commitments, supra note 2.
75 See DEFENSIVE PAT. LICENSE, http://www.defensivepatentlicense.org 
[https://perma.cc/CN9V-KRAT]; see also Schultz & Urban, supra note 8, at 7–10
(describing benefits of patent licensing); Royalty-Free Patent Licensing: Comparison Table,
GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/patents/licensing/comparison [https://perma.cc/HA29-AXFN].
76 Royalty-Free Patent Licensing: LOT Agreement, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/
patents/licensing/lot/ [https://perma.cc/99GT-8A6B].
77 Id.; see also SEDDON, supra note 7. 
78 See generally BELCHER & CASEY, supra note 5 (discussing the various strategies 
employed by companies, including Google and IBM). 
79 See generally Clark D. Asay, Patent Pacifism, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 645 (2017) 
(exploring some of the neglected implications of under assertion of patents).
80 The term open innovation has been defined in a variety of ways. It has been widely 
promoted by Henry W. Chesbrough, who defines it as “the use of purposive inflows and 
outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets for external 
use of innovation, respectively.” Henry Chesbrough, Open Innovation: A New Paradigm for 
Understanding Industrial Innovation, in OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW 
PARADIGM 1, 1 (Henry Chesbrough et al. eds., 2006). I define open innovation as a system 
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social good such as a clean environment or affordable access to healthcare 
products.81 The pledges are characterized as commitments to pursue a publicly 
beneficial goal.82
The link with something perceived to be of social value makes these patent 
pledges a good way of generating positive publicity about technology or product 
choices.83 This aspect is of particular importance to companies interested in 
improving either their own image or public views about patenting and 
companies that rely heavily on branding and customer loyalty.84
Patent pledges also provide a way for the patent holder to communicate 
underlying information regarding intellectual property and innovation strategies 
to relevant industry stakeholders.85 The pledges may publicize intentions to 
protect open-source projects, to work cooperatively in certain areas of 
technology, to move defensively on potential challengers, to participate in the 
adoption of an open standard, or to keep the costs of adopting a particular 
standard or using a particular technology low.86 These communications can be 
used to influence consumer and developer expectations about the adoption of a 
specific technology path or the future cost of using that technology path.87 They 
                                                                                                                     
of innovation that relies upon flows of knowledge across organizational boundaries and 
encourages the joint production and sharing of knowledge. While open-source systems of 
innovation such as that used to produce open-source software would fall under this 
definition, open innovation need not entail the free sharing of discoveries. In the patent 
pledge context, pledges may have very different views about and meanings attributed to 
“open innovation.”
81 See Contreras, Patent, supra note 3, at 552–55.
82 Id. at 590–91. 
83 Id. at 591. 
84 Id.; see also Tamara Rutter, Why Tesla Has the Most Loyal Customers, USA TODAY
(Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2014/09/06/why-tesla-has-the-most-
loyal-customers/15139377/ [https://perma.cc/GGV9-EU2C] (discussing importance of customer 
loyalty for Tesla’s strategy).
85 See Oliver Alexy & Markus Reitzig, Private-Collective Innovation, Competition and 
Firms’ Counterintuitive Appropriate Strategy, 42 RES. POL’Y 895, 898 (2013) (waiving 
exclusion rights found to foster norms of reciprocity and knowledge sharing). 
86 See id. at 908 (studying how firms involved in private-collective innovation use 
pledges as subtle coordination mechanisms to compete against firms proposing proprietary 
solutions). See generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network 
Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (1994) (exploring the economics of market competition 
between systems, as contrasted with competition between products, and importance of 
expectations, coordination, and compatibility in competition between systems).
87 See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 86, at 96 (explaining where demand is a function of 
expected size of the network, ability to influence expectations about adoption of a technology 
can lead to tipping effect, giving this technology a dominant position in the market; where 
purchase of technology today is influenced by price of complementary technology in the 
future, ability to influence expectations of the price of future technology will impact current 
purchase decisions).
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can also be used to influence industry norms about what should be available for 
free and what consumers should expect to pay for.88
Even where other social missions are also invoked, the focus of these patent 
pledges on the public benefits of “open innovation” remains a central and 
important characteristic of this subset of patent pledges.89 In a world in which 
innovation strategies increasingly involve a combination of open and 
proprietary uses of intellectual property and the use of open patent strategies for 
private business purposes, companies have an interest in promoting their own 
versions of openness.90 Patent pledges can be used to shape public views about 
what constitutes “open innovation,” the desirability of keeping innovation 
“open” in this way, and the relationship of the patent pledgor to relevant open 
innovation communities.91 The pledges provide a mechanism for companies to 
compete over what “open innovation” means, influencing which patents should 
be open and for what purposes.92
Google characterizes its pledge as “patents in the service of open source”
with the goal of promoting innovation through an open Internet.93 Panasonic 
talks about the Internet of Things, hoping to encourage other companies to 
contribute (without cost) their intellectual property to foster development of 
network services among devices such as Panasonic’s consumer electronics.94
IBM sticks more closely to Linux and open-source software that builds on 
Linux.95 Tesla talks about open technology platforms for electric vehicles.96
Blockchain emphasizes the power of permissionless innovation, an approach 
                                                                                                                     
88 See Joachim Henkel et al., The Emergence of Openness: How and Why Firms Adopt 
Selective Revealing in Open Innovation, 43 RES. POL’Y 879, 880 (2014) (“Because Linux is 
OSS, customers now expected the driver source code to be publicly available. It was this 
demand pull that led ECMs to rethink the established practice of keeping drivers closed.”).
89 While open innovation has many meanings, it is used in this Article to refer generally 
to a system of intellectual production that relies upon and encourages the sharing and use of 
knowledge across organizational boundaries. See definition of open innovation, supra note 
80.
90 See Henkel et al., supra note 88, at 879–80 (showing how open innovation can be 
supported through strategic forfeiture of IP rights, and examining how “openness” develops 
as a new dimension of competition); Joel West, How Open Is Open Enough? Melding 
Proprietary and Open Source Platform Strategies, 32 RES. POL’Y 1259, 1259–60, 1266–78 
(2003) (examining hybrid strategies of open and proprietary IP and how choices reflect 
tensions between adoption and appropriability).
91 See generally Henkel et al., supra note 88.
92 See id. at 880.
93 More Patents in the Service of Open Source, GOOGLE: GOOGLE OPEN SOURCE BLOG
(Aug. 8 2013), https://opensource.googleblog.com/2013/08/more-patents-in-service-of-open-
source.html [https://perma.cc/KUY5-DH62]. 
94 See Charlie Osborne, Panasonic Opens Royalty-Free Portfolio To Boost IoT 
Development, ZDNET (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.zdnet.com/article/panasonic-opens-royalty-
free-portfolio-to-boost-iot-development/ [https://perma.cc/DLU5-NYLU].
95 See Schultz & Urban, supra note 8, at 30–31 (noting that IBM’s pledge is narrowly 
aimed at open-source software).
96 See Musk, supra note 38.
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compatible with the characteristics of Blockchain technology and the massive 
disintermediation that it enables.97 In addition to competing over control of what 
“open innovation” means, pledges can also be a form of competition over the 
attention and support of open-source innovation communities.98 In all of these 
ways, controlling what an “open” system entails could allow a company to shape 
norms and influence choices in ways that favor its own business strategy—
regardless of the impact on social welfare.99
Taken together, these defining features of being unilateral promises to the 
public, free of charge, defensive in nature, and offered in support of a social 
mission tied to open innovation, make this subset of patent pledges a unique 
private ordering of patents with the potential to impact innovation.100 While 
patent pledges may address impediments that patents can create for at least some 
systems of open innovation, closer study suggests that the effects of patent 
pledges on innovation and the consequent impact on social welfare may be more 
complicated—particularly in areas characterized by platform competition.101
Part III shows how the subset of patent pledges described here form parts of 
innovation strategies through the use of two industry examples and, in doing so, 
also examines some of the complexities associated with patent pledge use in the 
                                                                                                                     
97 See Adam Thierer, CTFC’s Giancarlo on Permissionless Innovation for the 
Blockchain, TECHLIBERATION (Apr. 1, 2016), https://techliberation.com/2016/04/01/cftcs-
giancarlo-on-permissionless-innovation-for-the-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/BSE5-CCED].
98 See Heidemarie Hanekop & Patrick Feuerstein, Institutional Foundations of Open 
Innovation and Field Dynamics in the Software Industry: From Antagonism to Contested 
Cooperation Between Firms and Open Source Community 1–3 (2014) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://www.sofi-goettingen.de/fileadmin/Publikationen/Hanekop_SASE_Paper_
2014_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8DL-KGEA].
99 See Barnett, Costs, supra note 2, at 2, 7 (re-examining the “free is good” proposition 
and suggesting that unpriced distribution of information goods may create social costs). Even 
if the intent is to promote socially beneficial open innovation, it is unclear whether patent 
pledges will adequately address some of the risks that patents create for open innovation 
communities. See Liza S. Vertinsky, Making Room for Cooperative Innovation, 41 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2014) (examining the incentive problems that patents create for some 
forms of cooperative innovation); Clark D. Asay, Enabling Patentless Innovation, 74 MD.
L. REV. 431, 448 (2015) (arguing that patents create risks for certain kinds of open innovation 
communities and that using patent strategies to combat these risks is unlikely to be a viable 
long term strategy).
100 Private ordering in this context refers to private actors building in new ways of using, 
and not using, their patents, through the use of contract and noncontract mechanisms, in an 
effort to change how patents impact their particular domains of interest. For a discussion of 
private ordering, see generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
319 (2002). Patent scholarship is full of examples of the use of private ordering to address 
limits of patents. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, Engineering a Deal: Toward a 
Private Ordering Solution to the Anticommons Problem, 48 B.C. L. REV. 111, 114 (2007) 
(proposing a solution to the IP anticommons problem “based on private ordering by market 
actors within the context of existing laws”); Merges, supra note 9, at 1295 (discussing the 
private preempting of patent rights and the use of collective rights organizations). 
101 See infra Part IV for a discussion of the policy implications of efforts to promote 
open innovation.
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context of platform competition. Part IV goes on to discuss both the benefits and 
the particular types of costs that may arise from these types of patent pledges.
III. PATENT PLEDGES AS INNOVATION STRATEGIES
Many of the earliest patent pledges covered software patents relevant to the 
development and use of open-source software.102 Patent pledges continue to be 
popular in the realm of open-source software, often augmenting rights already 
provided by patent owners via a variety of open-source licenses.103 While open-
source software remains a focal point for many of the pledges, however, a
growing number encompass other emerging technology areas, most of which 
share in common an industry structure that involves some form of platform 
competition.104 After a brief introduction to pledges in the context of platform 
competition, this Part illustrates the use of the subset of pledges described in 
Part II as innovation strategies through two industry examples where many of 
these pledges have been concentrated, clean energy vehicles and cloud 
computing. The examples illustrate the characteristics of these patent pledges 
and identify the opportunities that arise for both socially beneficial and socially 
costly use of patent pledges.
A. Pledges and Platform Competition
Many patent pledges tend to be concentrated in high technology markets 
characterized by platform competition.105 It is therefore important to understand 
what technology platforms are and how patents and patent pledges may impact 
platform competition when assessing the effects of patent pledges.106
                                                                                                                     
102 Contreras, Patent, supra note 3, at 544–45. 
103 See Andrew Updegrove, Patent Pledges and Open Source Software Development,
STANDARDS BLOG (May 5, 2015), http://www.consortiuminfo.org/standardsblog/article.php?
story=20150429163511469 [https://perma.cc/LTT2-QFSC] (advocating for use of patent 
pledges in open-source software context, and suggesting they provide a useful and flexible 
way of augmenting rights provided under simple, general open-source licenses).
104 See Contreras, Patent, supra note 3, at 548–55 (discussing four categories of 
industries where patent pledges are used).
105 See Marco Iansiti & Feng Zhu, Dynamics of Platform Competition: Exploring the 
Role of Installed Base, Platform Quality and Consumer Expectations 2 n.1 (ICIS 2007 
Proceedings, Paper No. 38, 2007), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/39ad/744a21b09b9145ae7cd
ca0d7c88abe753e13.pdf [https://perma.cc/66KT-39GL] (defining platform as “a system with 
well-defined access points and rules on which other parties can build applications or 
services”). 
106 The social welfare effects of patents and pledges in platform economies are not well 
understood, although IP scholars interested in the economic organization of innovation have 
started to explore how they may impact platform competition. See generally Barnett, Host’s,
supra note 14, at 1927 (exploring role of patent forfeitures as strategies for committing to 
openness of a platform, with mixed social welfare effects); Robert P. Merges, IP Rights and 
Technological Platforms (Dec. 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1315522 [https://perma.cc/3XHN-U5TJ]
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A technology platform can be understood as infrastructure upon which other 
technologies, products, and services can be built.107 The platform itself serves 
no direct purpose for end users other than to enable and support one or more 
products or services that do serve the needs of end users.108 For computers, the 
platform might be the operating system and computer hardware developed to 
enable software applications.109 To succeed, a platform needs to attract both 
developers of products and services and customers.110 Facebook became a 
social media platform by enabling and enticing application developers to build 
applications on top of Facebook, and these applications attracted more users.111
To entice application developers, the platform must conform to a set of 
standards that allows the development of products and services that are 
compatible with the platform.112 These standards, and related information and 
technology needed to build products and services that work on the platform, can 
be protected as proprietary, can be made freely and openly available, or platform 
providers can pursue a hybrid strategy in which some aspects of the platform 
are open and some closed.113 A closed platform leaves the platform owner as 
gatekeeper in control of the applications, products, and/or services that can work 
                                                                                                                     
(exploring how IP functions for platform technologies and suggesting the need for rules that 
allow IP owners to credibly commit to open access).
107 For a general definition, see, for example, Derek Pilling, So, You Want To Be a 
Platform?, CLOUDAVE (Nov. 25, 2009), https://www.cloudave.com/1149/so-you-want-to-
be-a-platform/ [https://perma.cc/C753-473P]. For an analysis of platforms, see generally 
Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2991261 [https://perma.cc/68LZ-LPYX]. 
108 See Pilling, supra note 107.
109 For a more comprehensive definition, see, for example, TECHOPEDIA,
http://www.techopedia.com/definition/3411/platform [https://perma.cc/VKP4-4X94]; see 
also Cohen, supra note 107.
110 Pilling, supra note 107 (describing what makes a successful platform as more than 
just one which has the most developers; “a successful platform is one that facilitates the most 
value-creating interactions for the two or more customer groups it serves”). Evans and 
Schmalensee define an economic catalyst as “[a]n entity that has (a) two or more groups of 
customers; (b) who need each other in some way; but (c) who can’t capture the value from 
their mutual attraction on their own; and (d) rely on the catalyst to facilitate value-creating 
reactions between them.” DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, CATALYST CODE 3
(2007); see also, e.g., S. Sriram et al., Platforms: A Multiplicity of Research Opportunities
1–2, 7–8 (Ross Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1271, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2583816 [https://perma.cc/UW8W-2SYV] (denoting as one category 
of platforms “hardware/software” platforms, including computer operating systems, which 
bring together software developers and users). 
111 Pilling, supra note 107; see Cohen, supra note 107, at 17; Mark Neistat, What Is the 
3rd Platform and How Will It Affect Business?, TECH. FIRST, https://technologyfirst.
org/magazine-articles/124-may-2013/843-mark-neistat-us-signal-company.html [https://perma.cc/
V25E-8MXY] (discussing mobile computing and social networking as core parts of the next 
technology platform that will dominate IT). 
112 See West, supra note 90, at 1259–60. 
113 See id. at 1259–60 (examining hybrid proprietary and open-source strategies used by 
platform vendors, with competing imperatives for adoption and appropriability).
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with the system.114 Apple Inc.’s App Store and Amazon’s Cloud Platform are 
examples of closed platforms. An open technology platform is one that enables 
third parties to freely build applications and offer products or services that can 
be used on the platform without the control or approval of the platform owner.115
Rather than controlling development, the owner of the platform creates ways of 
allowing third parties to interface with and build on the platform.116 The owner 
of the platform may go even further, making available useful data for third 
parties to use in external application development.117 OpenStack employs an 
open platform approach, providing and supporting an open-source cloud 
computing platform.118 A hybrid strategy involves a mixed level of retained 
control and open access.119 Microsoft employs a hybrid approach in its cloud 
computing platform.120
When firms compete in platform-based markets, “the ability to create and 
capture economic value depends heavily on striking an appropriate balance 
between ‘open’ and proprietary strategies.”121 Network effects, where the value 
that consumers and developers place on the network increase as others adopt the 
platform, require firms to trade off appropriability to encourage platform 
adoption.122 Patent pledges play a role in this balancing act by serving as hybrid 
options somewhere in between proprietary and completely open patent 
strategies.123 They can help to promote adoption of a particular technology by 
                                                                                                                     
114 See id. at 1259. 
115 See Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 615, 616 (2000). 
116 See id.
117 See id. (describing Apple’s original design “with easy-access hardware ports and an 
accessible operating system, the purpose being to facilitate third-party development of 
compatible hardware and software accessories”).
118 See Richard Tee & C. Jason Woodard, Architectural Control and Value Migration 
in Layered Ecosystems: The Case of Open-Source Cloud Management Platforms 2 (SING.
MGMT. UNIV. RESEARCH COLLECTION SCH. OF INFO.SYS., 2013); see also Julie Bort, The 
Startups in This Hot Market Are All Vanishing, BUS. INSIDER (June 3, 2015), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/cisco-ibm-buy-openstack-startups-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/
8GNW-5JLM].
119 See West, supra note 90, at 1259, 1279–80. 
120 See id. at 1278. 
121 Tee & Woodard, supra note 118, at 2; see also Kevin Boudreau, Open Platform 
Strategies and Innovation: Granting Access vs. Devolving Control, 56 MGMT. SCI. 1849, 
1865 (2010); West, supra note 90, at 1259.
122 West, supra note 90, at 1259; see also Barnett, Host’s, supra note 14, at 1865, 1875 
(“Platform markets exhibit network effects—that is, the platform’s value is an increasing 
function of the number of users and uses.”). Network effects have interesting implications 
for IP policies. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of 
Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 483, 591 (1998) (emphasizing complexity 
of network effects and challenges of fashioning legal response; examining where and when 
legal rules should be modified to take into account network effects).
123 See West, supra note 90, at 1259–60; see also Contreras, Patent, supra note 3, at 545 
(“Their voluntary commitments thus occupy a largely uncharted middle ground between the 
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committing the patent holder to zero pricing for patents covering a technology 
platform.124 Where a platform provider forfeits its right to charge licenses for 
platform technology by relinquishing its intellectual property rights over this 
technology, it may compel competing stand-alone platform providers to exit the 
market altogether.125 Patent pledges can also impact public expectations about 
the future adoption of a particular technology path or the future cost of that 
technology path, with significant effects on competition in markets where there 
are strong network effects or where technology choices today depend on 
technology developments in the future.126
Where developers and consumers expect others to adopt a particular 
platform they will adopt it themselves, creating a tipping effect in the industry 
as expectations become self-fulfilling.127 Disentangling those patent pledges 
that are a natural part of the competitive process from those that are being used 
to foreclose entry or drive out existing competing platforms in a predatory 
manner may be difficult. But while the consequences of patent pledges for social 
welfare in platform competition are uncertain, their ability to impact 
innovation—for better or for worse—is not.128
The following two examples illustrate how pledges are being used as private 
innovation strategies in two important emerging technology areas, both of which 
involve platform competition.
                                                                                                                     
full commercial exploitation of patent rights and the abandonment of those rights to the 
public domain.”).
124 For a discussion of strategic forfeiture of IP in platform markets, see, for example, 
Barnett, Host’s, supra note 14, at 1884–89 (showing why platform holders may voluntarily 
forfeit valuable intellectual assets to encourage adoption and use of their platform).
125 This example is analyzed in Barnett, Host’s, supra note 14, at 1869.
126 See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 86, at 96, 98, 105–06 (explaining that where demand 
is a function of expected size of the network, ability to influence expectations about adoption 
of a technology can lead to a tipping effect, giving this technology a dominant position in 
the market; where purchase of technology today is influenced by the price of complementary 
technology in the future, ability to influence expectations of the price of future technology 
will impact current purchase decisions).
127 See, e.g., id. at 105–06 (exploring the economics of market systems in which network 
effects are present). 
128 See Barnett, Host’s, supra note 14, at 1925–26; Lemley & McGowan, supra note 
122, at 506 (“[A] standard-enhancing move in a network market might enhance efficiency 
on balance, even if it eliminates competition, since consumers of the standard product will 
benefit from increased adoption of the standard.”). For an argument that patent rights should 
be stronger where there are emerging platform technologies, see, for example, Lichtman, 
supra note 115, at 630 (arguing broad patent rights serve to enhance coordination between 
third party developers in ways that address the price externality and result in lower 
application process).
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B. Clean Energy Vehicles 
“We believe that Tesla, other companies making electric cars, and the 
world would all benefit from a common, rapidly-evolving technology 
platform.”
–Tesla129
“[W]e believe that when good ideas are shared, great things can happen.”
–Toyota130
In the summer of 2014, Tesla, the American producer of the first fully 
electric sports car, made the news with a public announcement from Tesla CEO
Elon Musk that “All our Patent Are Belong To You.”131 In a blog post, Musk 
announced that Tesla would “not initiate patent lawsuits against anyone who, in 
good faith, wants to use our technology.”132 Tesla’s unilateral public pledge to 
limit the assertion of its patents without charge was characterized as a 
commitment to an open-source approach to patents, with open patents used as a 
mechanism for advancing the development of electric vehicle technology.133
Tesla’s patent pledge is a unilateral promise to the public, with no return 
obligation on the part of the recipient.134 While it is more like an invitation to 
negotiate for a royalty-free license than a license in itself, the pledge does not 
contemplate any further negotiation or writing and the expectation seems to be 
that companies will simply use the patents.135 Elon Musk indicates on the Tesla 
website that “[w]e have had a number of inquiries from other car companies and 
we’ve told them to go ahead and use them.”136 While the original pledge was
notably short on details, and one of its key terms—the requirement to act in good 
faith—perhaps deliberately vague,137 Tesla subsequently amended its pledge to 
formalize the terms and limits of the pledge.138
Although the patent pledge may raise questions of legal enforceability, as 
discussed further in Part IV, the characteristics which make it less like a contract 
                                                                                                                     
129 Musk, supra note 38.
130 Toyota Opens, supra note 44.
131 Musk, supra note 38.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 See id.; see also Contreras, Patent, supra note 3, at 545.
135 See Eric Blattberg, Here’s What Tesla’s ‘Good Faith’ Patent Stance Actually Means,
VENTUREBEAT (June 14, 2014), https://venturebeat.com/2014/06/14/heres-what-teslas-good-
faith-patent-stance-actually-means/ [https://perma.cc/R8EB-YUB4].
136 Elon Musk Says Rivals Are Now Using Tesla Patents, TESLA: FORUM (Nov. 3, 2014, 
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tesla-patents [https://perma.cc/P3X9-5FHB].
137 See Musk, supra note 38; see also Jack Ellis, Toyota Shows Countrymen that Patent 
Value Creation Doesn’t Have To Be About Lawsuits, IAM (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.iam-
media.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=9c6de837-b370-419a-b5fc-9306b4e8338c [https://perma.cc/
X5GZ-Y3JK] (“[U]nlike Tesla, Toyota has provided a fair amount of detail on the nuts and 
bolts of how its programme will actually work.”).
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or license are also characteristics which may facilitate the use of pledges to build 
and support business relationships.139 The informal nature of the pledge, a blog 
post from Tesla’s CEO, allows for communication on multiple levels to 
different constituencies—Tesla’s customer base, potential and existing 
employees, investors—both private and government, industry partners, and 
competitors.140 Establishing a good relationship with the public is important to 
the company, which depends heavily on its brand and its loyal customer and 
potential customer following to sell its expensive electric sports cars.141 Tesla 
uses blog posts on a regular basis to communicate with the public in fun and 
interesting ways, and the patent pledge, “All Our Patent Are Belong To You,”
takes the form of a meme with appeal to popular culture.142 The patent pledge 
advertises Tesla’s open-source philosophy and emphasizes its social mission—
cleaner cars for a cleaner planet.143 The open-source approach has appeal to 
those customers, investors, and other supporters “who believe that patents are 
creating more problems than they solve.”144 The appeal to open source is also 
geared to attract talented engineers.145
Musk has indicated as part of the patent pledge that Tesla sees talented 
engineers rather than patents as its scarce resource and hopes that talented 
engineers will be attracted by this open innovation platform to work on Tesla 
                                                                                                                     
138 See Legal Notices Page, Patent Pledge, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/about/legal#
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140 See Musk, supra note 38.
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143 See Musk, supra note 38; see also About Tesla, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/about 
[https://perma.cc/KB6C-FKG7] (describing Tesla’s mission “to accelerate the world’s
transition to sustainable energy”).
144 See Musk, supra note 38; see also Matthew Rimmer, Tesla Motors’ Open Source 
Revolution: Intellectual Property and the Carbon Crisis, MEDIUM (June 15, 2014), 
https://medium.com/@DrRimmer/tesla-motors-open-source-revolution-intellectual-property-and-
the-carbon-crisis-95259ff867e6 [https://perma.cc/NYA5-3TK5] (“Elon Musk’s embrace of an 
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145 See Rimmer, supra note 144; see also Musk, supra note 38.
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technology.146 The use of pledges to generate popular appeal among employees, 
customers, and the public at large is a common aspect of many of the pledges 
made.147
While the pledge seems designed to build the relationship between the 
company and its relevant constituents, it is also no doubt intended to influence 
their expectations about cost and access to Tesla’s desired technology 
platform.148 Here a platform refers to the infrastructure that is needed to make 
electric cars work, such as charging stations that are compatible with the electric 
cars.149 The ability to influence expectations about whether a particular 
technology will be adopted as an industry platform and whether this platform 
will remain open is critical in settings like this where large initial investments 
by developers are required, network effects are strong, and both customers and 
suppliers are worried about being locked into a technology choice that later 
proves undesirable.150 Tesla’s CEO explains the rationale for its patent pledge 
as a belief that “Tesla, other companies making electric cars, and the world 
would all benefit from a common, rapidly-evolving technology platform” that 
Tesla’s portfolio of now free patents helps to support.151 Tesla plans to compete 
with big automobile companies through the collaborative, open development of
an electric vehicle platform compatible with—ideally modeled on—Tesla’s
technology.152 The patent pledge is most likely designed to impact expectations 
about whether electric vehicle technology will become the dominant platform 
for clean energy vehicles, whether the technology that is adopted will be 
compatible with Tesla’s technology choices, and whether the platform will 
                                                                                                                     
146 See Rimmer, supra note 144; see also Musk, supra note 38.
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remain an open access platform.153 The patent pledge helps to convince industry 
participants that Tesla is committed to an industry-wide open platform for 
electric vehicle technology and that Tesla will offer its own intellectual property 
contributions to this platform royalty-free.
In addition to infrastructure, cost is a second major barrier that electric cars 
face, and batteries are a large part of this cost.154 Tesla invests heavily in 
improving its battery technology, and in an ambitious move Tesla has 
undertaken construction of a five billion dollar “gigafactory” to produce battery 
kits for electric vehicles.155 Tesla is interested not only in lowering the cost of 
its cars through cheaper batteries, but also in battery sales as a major source of 
revenue.156 This is another reason for its interest in encouraging adoption of its 
own electric vehicle standards through patent pledges and other means—battery 
sales are tied to sales of compatible electric vehicles.157
While many of Tesla’s patents and patent applications concern battery 
technology,158 it is also amassing first mover advantages through its 
construction of the massive state of the art manufacturing facility and 
considerable know how in battery production, providing it with alternative 
sources of competitive advantage.159 Tesla has sought collaboration in battery 
technology, perhaps to influence adoption of its preferred standards, but its 
efforts to expand discussions of collaboration with BMW beyond charging 
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(“Though Tesla does not own every aspect of this infrastructure, nationwide adoption of an 
electric vehicle platform could yield huge dividends to Tesla as a first mover and supplier of 
vehicles, parts, batteries, charging stations, and the like . . . .”). 
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stations into battery and lightweight-composite technologies do not appear to 
have fared well,160 and its battery supply deal with Toyota was not renewed.161
Tesla’s patent pledge coincided roughly with the expiration of a battery-supply 
deal between Tesla and Toyota162 and disinvestment of Tesla stock by 
Daimler.163 Shifting its attention to consumers, the pledge by Tesla may reflect 
an effort to encourage public support for Tesla’s standard, thus influencing 
developer expectations about the likelihood that Tesla’s standard will become 
an industry standard.164 Proterra, a leading manufacturer of electric buses, 
recently followed in Tesla’s shoes and made a promise to make patents relating 
to its electric vehicle fast charging system freely available with the hope that it 
would “accelerate widespread EV technology adoption and infrastructure 
development.”165
Toyota, a competitor with an alternative vision of what clean energy cars 
should look like, responded to Tesla’s efforts with its own patent pledge.166
Toyota announced its patent pledge covering hydrogen fuel powered vehicles in 
January 2015 at the large Consumer Electronics Show technology 
conference.167 Toyota has been involved in research and development of 
technologies for clean energy transportation for quite some time, and it has 
developed both electric cars, such as the hybrid Toyota Prius, as well as a “large 
portfolio of patents” covering alternative clean vehicle technologies.168 After an 
earlier and relatively unsuccessful collaboration with Tesla in electric vehicle 
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technology,169 Toyota has focused its recent efforts on developing a hydrogen 
fuel cell vehicle, the Toyota Mirai.170 The Mirai is the world’s first mass-market 
hydrogen-powered car.171
The pledge marks a distinct change from Toyota’s traditional approach to 
its intellectual property.172 The stated rationale for Toyota’s pledge was, similar 
to Tesla’s rationale, the need for a common technology platform to support 
hydrogen-powered electric vehicles.173 The biggest challenge to fuel cell cars is 
the lack of hydrogen filling stations.174 There are only about a dozen hydrogen 
fueling stations across the United States.175 Bob Carter, senior vice president of 
Toyota automotive operations, explained that the development of the first 
generation of fuel cell vehicles will require a “concerted effort and 
unconventional collaboration between automakers, government regulators, 
academia, and energy providers.”176 The pledge is seemingly intended to 
encourage adoption of hydrogen fuel cell technology as a platform technology, 
making it more attractive for producers of hydrogen cars and suppliers of the 
necessary hydrogen fuel infrastructure to enter the market.177
In its patent pledge, Toyota promises royalty-free use of approximately 
5,680 fuel cell related patents, including critical technologies that were 
developed for the Toyota Mirai.178 The patents are “made available to 
automakers who will produce and sell fuel cell vehicles, as well as to fuel cell
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parts suppliers and energy companies who establish and operate fuelling 
stations,” and companies that develop and introduce fuel cell buses and 
industrial equipment.179 “Requests from parts suppliers and companies looking
to adapt fuel cell technology outside of the transportation sector will be 
evaluated on a case by case basis.”180 Companies that want to take advantage of 
the pledge must enter into a written agreement with Toyota.181 “Toyota will 
request, but will not require,” prospective licensees to provide licenses to “their 
own fuel cell-related patents with Toyota for similar royalty-free use.”182
Under the terms of Toyota’s pledge, the “[p]atents related to fuel cell 
vehicles will be available” pursuant to “royalty-free licenses until the end of 
2020[, and] [p]atents for hydrogen production and supply will remain [available 
for royalty-free use] for an unlimited duration.”183 This means that 5,610 of the 
5,680 patents will only be made available until 2020—the period of time that 
Toyota believes it will take for the first generation of hydrogen vehicles to be 
available to the mass market.184 The seventy patents that will be made available 
indefinitely relate to hydrogen production and supply for filling stations, critical 
infrastructure if fuel cell vehicles are to succeed.185 While Toyota’s patent 
pledge only encompasses fuel cell-related patents wholly owned by Toyota, a 
small portion of its total patent portfolio of more than 25,000 issued U.S. 
patents,186 this number dwarfs Tesla’s entire patent portfolio.187 If Toyota 
succeeds in establishing its hydrogen fuel cell technology as an industry 
standard, it will have significant control over that standard. 
The confluence of Tesla and Toyota pledges has been compared by 
commentators to an “open patent war,” with the pledges described as salvos in 
the competition for alternative clean energy transportation technologies.188 The 
competition takes on an international dimension, since the United States was 
initially a supporter of fuel cell technology but later abandoned it in favor of 
alternatives such as electric cars and biofuels, with Japan now emerging as a 
champion of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles.189 Tesla and Toyota have both 
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received support from their respective governments in their clean energy vehicle 
development efforts.190 Both Tesla and Toyota seem to be focusing on the need 
to support open technology platforms as a necessary part of their business 
models, and are using patent pledges to assure market participants that their 
pledged patents will not be used to hinder access to these technology platforms 
and to encourage adoption and use of the patented technologies.191
While the pledges made by Tesla and Toyota are no doubt designed to 
promote adoption of preferred clean energy vehicle platforms and to encourage 
innovation in these platforms,192 the pledges are also impacting the price of 
different technologies, expectations about and preferences over alternative 
technologies, and the attractiveness of competing technologies, in ways that are 
hard to identify.193 The actual effects of the pledges on innovation within the 
broader market for clean energy cars over time are thus difficult to predict and 
will depend in part on future decisions made by the holders of the pledged 
patents.
Ford, one of the largest U.S. automakers with its own hybrid and fully 
electric vehicles, subsequently entered the patent pledge fray with its own 
promise to “open” up its electrified vehicle patents, although not without a 
fee.194 Ford promised to make a portfolio of its patents relating to electrified 
vehicle technology available to “competitive automakers to accelerate industry-
wide research and development of electrified vehicles.”195
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“Ford has more than 650 electrified vehicle patents and approximately 
1,000 pending patent applications on electrified vehicle technology,” with 400 
of these applications filed in 2014.196 Ford is most likely using its patent pledge 
to focus industry attention on vehicles with moderate hybrid technology (Ford’s
hybrid drivetrain technology) rather than “fully-electric or plug-in hybrid 
cars.”197 Ford’s use of patent pledges suggests that patent pledges play a role, 
or at least are believed to play a role, in influencing supplier and consumer 
decisions about alternative technology standards and platforms.
The common theme running through these uses of patent pledges in the 
clean energy vehicle industry is the role of pledges as mechanisms to influence 
the adoption, development, use, and price of a particular technology platform.198
The growing use of pledges is accompanied by greater use of other defensive 
patenting practices that potentially impact competition, such as participation by 
competitors Honda and Hyundai in the IP3 (Industry Patent Purchase 
Program)199 and the participation by Ford, Hyundai, Kia, Subaru, Mazda, 
Nissan and Honda in the LOT Network (in which members agree to license any 
patent that is transferred to other members in the network).200 The potential 
social welfare implications of these patent pledge strategies are explored further 
in Part IV.
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C. Patent Pledges in the Cloud
“As the web becomes something that lives through and on the phone, and 
software something handled in a cloud, the clear lines that once defined 
territories and strategies are blurring.”201
“Things used to be so simple. It was once easy to characterize companies 
as either open or closed. But the sands are changing . . . .”202
Cloud computing allows computing resources to be delivered on-demand as 
a service through the use of shared computer resources accessed over the 
internet or through mobile devices.203 The cloud refers to the large data centers 
that perform computing tasks.204 Cloud computing technologies are altering the 
ways in which information can be managed, stored, and shared and, in doing so, 
are changing the dynamics of information and technology markets and the ways 
in which companies in these markets compete.205 Intellectual property strategies 
are shifting in response, and patent pledges are being deployed as part of these 
strategies.206
The basic provision of cloud computing services is dominated by a small 
number of large firms, with Amazon, Microsoft and Google leading the pack 
and traditional information technology companies like IBM following 
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behind.207 These competitors are interested in having their own respective 
approaches to cloud computing serve as the industry standard and they are using 
intellectual property strategies to assist in this goal.208 Their strategies vary,
however, both in terms of the extent to which they rely upon open platforms and 
in the features of their platform that are open versus proprietary.209 An open 
cloud platform is one that features interoperability and data portability for users,
and provides the information needed for developers to freely design applications 
for the system, with some industry debate over whether open also implies open 
source.210 IBM and Google pursue a relatively open cloud computing 
strategy.211 A closed system limits the movement of customers and their data 
and keeps application programming interfaces and related intellectual property 
proprietary.212 Amazon pursues a proprietary cloud strategy.213 In addition to 
choices over open, closed, or hybrid clouds, these competitors also diverge in 
their choices of public, private, or hybrid cloud offerings.214 A public cloud
involves pooled, shared computing resources that are accessed over the internet;
a private cloud is operated within a single customer’s firewall and under its own 
control; and hybrid clouds allow a mix of public and private cloud computing.215
Amazon and Google focus primarily on public clouds, while Microsoft and IBM 
offer hybrid clouds.
Amazon has by far the largest share of the cloud computing market, 
benefiting from a first mover advantage, strong economies of scale, and strong 
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network effects.216 As Amazon attracts more customers, the costs of providing 
public cloud services fall and the attractiveness of the Amazon cloud platform 
to application developers increases.217 As the number of applications for the 
Amazon platform increases, the attractiveness of the platform to customers also 
increases. Not surprisingly, given Amazon’s already substantial market share 
and ability to leverage network effects and scale economies, Amazon has not 
been interested in opening up its patent portfolio or its platform. Instead, 
Amazon’s intellectual property strategies appear to be designed to maintain its 
cloud computing platform as a proprietary system that limits interoperability 
with other platforms.218 Amazon is alone among the market leaders in its focus 
on closed cloud platforms, and is the only one of the market leaders not to make 
patent pledges.219
In contrast to Amazon’s proprietary cloud platform, Microsoft, Google, and 
IBM are proponents of hybrid and open cloud platforms.220 They appear to be 
using patent pledges strategically to influence the attractiveness of their 
platforms for both developers of applications and customers, to encourage the 
use of complementary proprietary products, and to control the nature and type 
of openness of dominant cloud technologies.221 The different ways in which 
each of these three companies earn their revenue influence the types of 
technologies that they would like to have freely available and those areas that 
they would prefer to keep as proprietary, and these differences are reflected in 
their patent pledges.
Microsoft is now in fierce competition with Amazon and Google to capture 
cloud computing customers for its hybrid cloud platform Azure.222 In its pursuit 
of customers and developers, it is moving away from its traditional proprietary 
strategies to engage in open-source licensing and patent pledges.223
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The move away from proprietary strategies is limited, however. Microsoft’s
patent pledges have taken the form of relatively narrow, unilateral promises to 
limit the assertion of Microsoft patents against developers and customers who 
implement Microsoft approved specifications.224 These pledges are designed to 
facilitate and encourage the implementation and use of the identified 
specifications.225 Given its continuing interest in sales of proprietary software, 
Microsoft’s patent pledges are likely informed by its interest both in lowering 
the cost of things that are complementary to software sales and in allowing 
interoperability between its software and different technologies.226 The pledges 
are carefully crafted to focus on allowing interoperability with certain Microsoft 
products.227
While IBM and Google have both advocated for “open” approaches to cloud 
computing, their approaches appear to diverge in the nature of the openness that 
they advocate for, the open-source technologies and standards they promote, 
and the parts of the cloud platform they would like to keep as proprietary.228
The competition over alternative visions of “open” is evident in their patent 
pledge strategies. IBM’s earliest patent pledges were designed to protect and 
promote the development and use of a specific type of open-source software—
the Linux operating system.229 IBM’s more recent patent strategies have 
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expanded to include protection and encouragement of the development and use 
of a cloud open-source operating system called OpenStack.230 OpenStack is an 
open-source cloud operating system that supports the building and management 
of cloud computing platforms.231 It was started in 2010 as a joint project 
between Rackspace Hosting and NASA, and it is now managed by OpenStack 
Foundation, an open-source cloud computing community with over 189 
organizations and over 9,100 individual participants.232 OpenStack offers an 
alternative open-source platform to compete with proprietary platforms such as 
that used by Amazon Web Services.233 After considering alternative ways of 
handling patents, the OpenStack Foundation decided to require contributing 
members to OpenStack to agree to the terms of the Apache 2.0 open-source 
license, a decision it has since revisited but not changed.234 IBM is building its 
cloud computing offerings to work in conjunction with OpenStack and would 
no doubt like to position OpenStack as the industry standard.235 OpenStack has 
been heavily supported not just by IBM, but also by other large corporate players 
that have vested interests in the broad adoption and use of OpenStack.236
Google derives a large share of its revenue from advertising in a variety of 
ways that utilize the Internet, and therefore stands to benefit from expanding the 
use of the Internet by facilitating access and keeping the cost of information 
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low.237 While Google has diversified its efforts to include revenues from areas 
such as cloud platform technologies, investing heavily in its own proprietary 
Google Cloud Platform and a suite of cloud applications, it continues to be very 
interested in ensuring open access to the Internet to support its cloud based 
offerings as well.238 Google’s patent pledges reflect this vision of and 
concentration on an open Internet.239 Google made its first patent pledge in 
March 2013 when it announced the “Open Patent Non-assertion Pledge.”240
Pursuant to this pledge, Google promises not to sue any user, distributor or 
developer of free software or open-source software on specified patents unless 
Google is attacked first.241 Also according to the terms of this pledge, Google 
will require any subsequent assignee of the pledged patents to agree to abide by 
the pledge.242 Google’s first patent pledge included ten patents relating to 
MapReduce and Hadoop programming models that have applications in cloud 
computing environments.243 One of the patents in this group was a controversial 
patent that covered parallel processing in tools like Hadoop used by many 
products and services in the area of big data.244 Google subsequently expanded 
its “Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge” to include seventy-nine additional 
patents covering essential elements of big data important to cloud computing,245
followed soon after by another 152 patents relating to technologies that facilitate 
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244 Barb Darrow, The Week in Cloud: AWS Goes Mobile; Google Vows Patent Pledge; 
Cloud Wars Rage On, GIGAOM (Mar. 31, 2013), https://gigaom.com/2013/03/31/the-week-in-
cloud-aws-goes-mobile-google-vows-patent-pledge-cloud-wars-rage-on/ [https://perma.cc/GTG4-
PR5H].
245 See, e.g., Frederic Lardinois, Google Adds 79 Cloud and Big Data Patents to Its Open 
Patent Non-Assertion Pledge, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 8, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/08/
08/google-adds-79-new-cloud-and-big-data-patents-to-its-open-patent-non-assertion-pledge/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y5FX-F49R].
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speed and security on the web and 5 patents relating to MapReduce data-
processing technology.246
While Google advocates for an open innovation ecosystem, its patent 
pledges are notably limited in both scope and the number of patents included. 
The pledges are limited to use of open-source software and do not extend to any 
proprietary software or hardware used in combination with open-source 
software.247 Google’s patent filings have increased exponentially over the last 
ten years and Google is now one of the top winners of U.S. software patents and 
the owner of more than 51,000 patents.248 This means only a very small fraction 
of the patents in Google’s rapidly growing patent portfolio are included. 
Moreover, the pledges include a defensive termination provision that sweeps 
broadly to cover not only Google and its affiliates, but also third parties using 
Google’s products and services.249 The pattern of Google’s patenting and 
pledging behavior suggest a strategy that makes some aspects of software and 
cloud computing open while leaving others proprietary.
The use, and nonuse, of patents in the cloud computing market is designed 
to impact the choices that customers make over what cloud computing platform 
or service to select, the choices that application developers make, as well as the 
choices made by actual and potential competitors in the cloud computing and 
related markets.250 Patent pledges are playing an important, but poorly 
understood role in this industry, refashioning the relationships between patents, 
competition, and innovation in ways that may bring costs as well as benefits.251
                                                                                                                     
246 Google Developers, Announcement of Expansion of Open Patent Non-Assertion 
Pledge, GOOGLE+ (Aug. 26, 2014), https://plus.google.com/+GoogleDevelopers/posts/eJFWj3V
NG1L [https://perma.cc/TH58-JCMC].
247 Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge, supra note 240.
248 See, e.g., Antonio Regalado, Google’s Growing Patent Stockpile, MIT TECH. REV.:
BUS. IMPACT (Nov. 29, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/521946/
googles-growing-patent-stockpile/ [https://perma.cc/YJ2R-W2YN].
249 Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge, supra note 240.
250 Vertinsky, supra note 212, at 275. 
251 For a detailed look at the role of patent pledges in the cloud, see generally id. at 260–
76.
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IV. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PATENT PLEDGES
“The promise given was a necessity of the past: the word broken is a 
necessity of the present.”
-Niccolo Machiavelli252
Part IV begins with a brief overview of benefits that patent pledges offer, 
many of which have been highlighted in the existing literature on patent pledges, 
and then turns to focus on the relatively neglected potential costs of patent 
pledges. While the unique characteristics of patent pledges provide advantages 
to the private actors who make them, there is no guarantee that the use of patent 
pledges will also lead to improvements in social welfare.253 The private and 
unilateral nature of the pledge allows the patent pledgor to craft the terms of the 
pledge with private rather than public interests in mind.254 The decentralized 
nature of pledges allows for tailoring of pledges to individual contexts and needs 
in ways that may or may not promote broader systems of open innovation.255
Questions about the legal enforceability of patent pledges and the relationship 
between the pledged restrictions and the patent may further limit the social 
benefits and increase the social costs associated with their use.256 Given the 
variety of different ways in which patent pledges may be made, and the variety 
of motivations for their use, there are currently no good legal mechanisms for 
sorting out beneficial from costly uses ex ante, and constraining the latter. Here 
I identify four types of benefits that patent pledges offer and three types of costs 
that patent pledges could pose. In Part IV, I suggest a way of mitigating these 
costs while preserving socially beneficial uses of patent pledges.
A. Benefits of Patent Pledges
As noted in the introduction, patent pledges have been widely celebrated as 
mechanisms for opening up the patent system.257 They have been described as 
mechanisms for mitigating some of the costs of a patent system overly focused 
                                                                                                                     
252 JAMES WOOD, DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS FROM ANCIENT AND MODERN, ENGLISH 
AND FOREIGN SOURCES 449 (1899).
253 For a discussion of the disconnect between the private benefits accruing to patent 
holders and public benefits from the patent grant, see generally Ted Sichelman, Purging 
Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2014) (discussing the 
disconnect between the private benefits accruing to patent holders and public benefits from 
the patent grant).
254 See Tracy, supra note 139, at 20. 
255 See id. at 20.
256 See id. at 3–5, 24–28; see also Contreras, Market, supra note 8, at 482 (“Despite the 
increasing prevalence of patent pledges and their importance to the economy, current legal 
theories do not adequately support the enforcement of these promises.”). 
257 See generally Chien, Opening, supra note 2 (discussing the role of patent pledges in 
making it easier to share technology, allowing patent owners to rebalance the patent system; 
suggests reorienting the patent system to better support open innovation models). 
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on exclusion by introducing elements more consistent with collaboration and 
knowledge sharing.258 The benefits of nonassertion agreements and offers of 
royalty-free cross-licenses, of which patent pledges are a subset, are recognized 
in the DOJ and FTC reports and guidelines addressing antitrust considerations 
in intellectual property arrangements.259 The specific benefits of pledges fall 
into four main categories: (1) providing a private mechanism for patent sharing 
not available under the statutory scheme; (2) reducing transaction costs; (3) 
encouraging technology adoption and use, particularly in the presence of 
network effects; and (4) reduced patent litigation risks.
1. Mechanism for Patent Sharing
Patent pledges provide a relatively low cost, easy way of opening up patents 
for interested parties to use them, creating a private mechanism for sharing in 
the absence of a statutory sharing mechanism from within patent law.260 They 
can be seen as just one of the many ways in which private ordering is used to 
address patent barriers and encourage open innovation.261
2. Lowers Transaction Costs
Patent pledges have the potential to reduce transaction costs, as well as the 
overall cost of developing technologies that are covered by pledged patent 
rights. They can reduce transaction costs for the patent owner by providing a 
low cost way of making patents widely accessible to the public.262 They reduce 
transaction costs for interested users of the patented technology by dispensing 
with the need to identify whether a license is needed and removing the need to 
negotiate a license.263 The diverse, decentralized, and informal ways in which 
patent pledges can be made allow them to function as flexible and cheap forms 
of communication, further lowering transaction costs.264 The communication 
may involve intentions to support open-source projects, interest in collaboration, 
or a willingness to allow patented technology to become part of an open 
technology platform. The reduction of high transaction costs associated with 
negotiating bilateral and multilateral licenses might allow productive 
technology partnerships to form in areas where they otherwise might not.
                                                                                                                     
258 See Tracy, supra note 139, at 35 (discussing the benefits of patent pledges).
259 See, e.g., DOJ & FTC, ENFORCEMENT, supra note 20, at 57–61, 88–91.
260 See Chien, Opening, supra note 2, at 840–45.
261 See id. 
262 Id. at 841. 
263 See id.
264 See id. at 800, 841. 
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3. Facilitates Adoption and Use of New Technologies
Patent pledges can be used to encourage the adoption of new technologies, 
particularly those that bring with them social welfare benefits, such as the 
adoption of green technologies or the development of, and access to,
technologies used to produce essential health products.265 This was the idea 
behind the formation of the (now defunct) Eco-Patent Commons, a patent 
community in which companies pledged their patents to further environmentally 
friendly technologies.266 Nonassertion provisions have been used to provide 
access to patented research tools that are important in biomedical research.267
The pledges allow patent owners to make credible commitments to keep their 
technology open, allowing both the patent owner and potential adopters of the 
technology to benefit.268 Patent pledges and other defensive patenting strategies 
have played an important role in the growth of open-source software 
communities by providing protection against infringement suits to open-source 
developers and users.269 Many of the participants in open-source projects would 
not be able to absorb the costs needed to defend themselves against patent suits
or the costs of acquiring their own defensive patent portfolio.270
4. Reducing Patent Litigation Risks
The defensive aspect of the pledges can be used to provide some protection 
to open-source projects, although it likely will have limited impact on the 
behavior of patent assertion entities. The basic idea behind defensive patent 
licensing is to build up a patent portfolio in order to deter offensive patent 
suits.271 This strategy can be effective in deterring litigation in situations where 
the firms involved are practicing entities that might suffer from a return 
lawsuit.272 The development of the LOT Network offers a further innovation 
designed to reduce the threat from patent assertion entities by requiring 
                                                                                                                     
265 Contreras, Patent, supra note 3, at 552–55. 
266 See ECO-PATENT COMMONS, https://ecopatentcommons.org/ [https://perma.cc/J5U6-
X2HS] (discussing mission to manage patents pledged for unencumbered use by companies 
and IP rights holders to make it easier and faster to innovate and implement technologies 
that improve and protect the environment). But see Eco-Patent Commons Statement, E-PC,
https://ecopatentcommons.org/sites/default/files/docs/eco-patent_commons_executive_board_
statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5U6-X2HS] (unfortunately the Eco-Patent Commons ceased 
active operation in May 2016 due to a lack of new members interested in joining).
267 See Anatole Krattiger, The Use of Nonassertion Covenants: A Tool To Facilitate 
Humanitarian Licensing, Manage Liability, and Foster Global Access, in 1 INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION 739, 741 (Anatole 
Krattiger et al. eds., 2007). 
268 See Contreras, Market, supra note 8, at 481–82. 
269 See Contreras, Patent, supra note 3, at 585–86.
270 See id. 
271 Id. at 6–7.
272 Id.
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members of the network to license their patents to other members upon transfer 
of a patent to a patent assertion entity.273 Pledges appeal to the open-source 
community and can be used to encourage open-source innovation projects that 
might otherwise not survive.
B. Costs of Patent Pledges 
While patent pledges offer not only private but also social benefits, this 
Article points out that they can also be used in ways that generate social costs.
It identifies three types of costs that patent pledges can create for social welfare: 
(1) costs arising from patent hold-up; (2) foreclosure of alternative technology 
paths; and (3) use of pledges to create barriers to entry, particularly for startup 
companies pursuing divergent technology paths. These costs arise where patent 
holders exploit limitations in the legal framework governing patent pledges 
along with private information about their intellectual property and business 
strategies to act opportunistically. Opportunistic behavior in this context refers 
to behavior that, although technically legal, is designed to secure unintended 
benefits from the legal system in socially costly ways.274
1. Patent Hold-Up
Patent pledges create hold-up risks when the pledges encourage users of 
patented technology to make technology-specific investments while the patent 
holder retains the ability to assert patents that cover either (a) these technology 
choices, or (b) essential complementary technologies once investments have 
been sunk.275 The investments that patent pledges encourage can take a variety 
of forms, including product design choices, customer time spent learning how 
to use a particular technology, and time spent by the user or a manufacturer 
customizing the product or service.276 Patent hold-up may come in the form of 
direct increases in cost, such as the charging of a fee for a product or service 
that was formerly available for free, or in the form of indirect increases in costs, 
such as increased disclosure of consumer data or increased advertising.277 This 
                                                                                                                     
273 See Schulman, supra note 8; see also SEDDON, supra note 7. 
274 This definition of opportunism is based on that developed by Henry Smith in his 
work on the role of equity in the law. See, e.g., Smith, Equity, supra note 24, at 8–9.
275 See Contreras, Market, supra note 8, at 489. Patent hold-up occurs when a patent 
owner takes advantage of the reduced flexibility a company has after it has adopted patented 
technology to extract more than reasonable royalties. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl 
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007) (studying 
problems of patent hold-up that can occur when a patent covers one component or feature of 
a complex product). 
276 Contreras, Market, supra note 8, at 489. 
277 See Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 2, at 624–26 (discussing psychological and 
behavioral economics research showing biasing effects of free offers, emphasizing the 
personal information transactions that make many “free” internet services costly); see also
Jorge L. Contreras, Equity, Antitrust, and the Reemergence of the Patent Unenforceability 
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patent pledge hold-up problem is a variant of the widely discussed and studied 
hold-up problems that arise when the holder of a patent covering a component 
of a much bigger product, a necessary complementary good, or a standard can 
act opportunistically once investments have been sunk to exploit the reduced 
flexibility of the technology user and extract more than a reasonable royalty for 
the patent.278 As discussed in this literature, patent hold-up can negatively 
impact cumulative innovation, distort competition, and lead to inefficient 
technology choices, as well as inflating the price of products and services 
covered by the patent for end users.279
The most direct way in which pledges can create hold-up costs is through 
limits in the term or number of patents that are included in a patent pledge.
Where the pledge encourages adoption of an emerging technology, these limits 
create opportunities for asserting either the same patents or related patents 
covering the patented technology in the future once investments in the 
technology have been sunk. In the context of the clean energy vehicle pledges 
discussed in Part III, this risk of hold-up has yet to be realized since the pledges 
are relatively recent and the pledge makers are still focused on encouraging 
adoption of their competing clean energy technologies. Toyota’s pledge of its
hydrogen fuel technology patents has a term that expires in 2020, for 
example.280 This leaves Toyota free to assert any unexpired patents, or new ones 
that it subsequently obtains, for licensing or litigation purposes once its 
hydrogen fuel cell vehicle technology has been adopted. Tesla’s patent pledge 
does not include a term limit,281 and the informal nature of the pledge leaves 
open the possibility it could be revoked in the future once Tesla’s electric 
                                                                                                                     
Remedy, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1–2 (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter Contreras, Equity], 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1187&context=facsch_lawre
v [https://perma.cc/T5ZU-KT9C] (discussing hold-up, which occurs where patent holders offer 
standards for free and then once users are locked in, begin seeking royalties).
278 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Jeffery M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented 
Standards, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1, 10–13 (2009) (examining patent hold-up problems in contexts 
of standards); see also Thomas Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust 
Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1160 (2009) (providing broad view of patent hold up as 
opportunistic behavior resulting in static and dynamic inefficiency); Lemley & Shapiro, 
supra note 275, at 1993 (discussing how patent hold-up and threat of injunction can influence 
royalties, “especially if the patented technology covers one component of a complex 
product”). 
279 See Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 
603, 608, 614–15 (2007) (exploring some of the social costs from patent hold-up, including 
negative impact on cumulative innovation, the burden of excessive royalties, and negative 
impacts on the competitive process for selecting technologies); see also DOJ & FTC,
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 20, at 35 n.11, 36 & n.17.
280 Jack Ellis, Toyota Shows Countrymen that Patent Value Creation Doesn’t Have To 
Be About Lawsuits, IAM (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.iam-media.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=
9c6de837-b370-419a-b5fc-9306b4e8338c [https://perma.cc/X5GZ-Y3JK].
281 See generally Musk, supra note 38 (lacking any description of a time limit to the use 
of Tesla’s patent pledges). 
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vehicle technology has been adopted—at least with respect to potential 
technology developers or users who have not already relied upon the pledge.
In the cloud computing context and, more generally, in internet based 
computing platforms, variants of patent pledge hold-up are already occurring in 
ways that generate large but hidden costs for consumers and other industry 
stakeholders. Patent pledges, along with other complementary zero-pricing 
strategies, are used by some of the largest providers of cloud and mobile device 
platforms, including Google, IBM, and even Microsoft (although not Amazon) 
to promote the open and “free” nature of their preferred computing platforms.
Yet customers of “free” computing platforms are, sometimes unknowingly, 
authorizing platform providers to access, use, and transfer their data for 
advertising purposes, and these information costs often increase over time as 
customers become locked into existing technology choices.282 The platform 
providers are able to increase the “price” of their free technologies over time, 
after consumers have invested in the platform, with the price increase taking the 
indirect form of greater attention and information costs for consumers.283
Platform providers in two-sided markets also engage in hold-up by increasing 
the cost to developers of accessing the platform once the platform has attracted 
a large enough customer base, raising the costs of application development in 
ways that ultimately impact costs to consumers.284
Even if the party making the patent pledge has no intention of acting 
opportunistically, under the current state of the law it is unclear whether the 
pledge is enforceable, what the consequences are if it simply disappears from 
the company’s website, and whether the pledge will follow the pledged patents 
if they are transferred to another entity through sale, donation, or bankruptcy.285
                                                                                                                     
282 See, e.g., Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 2, at 610–11 (emphasizing the 
personal information transactions that make many “free” internet services costly); William 
Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under the Stored 
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role within zero-price markets); see also Jeremy Singer-Vine & Anton Troianovski, How 
Kid Apps Are Data Magnets, WALL ST. J. (June 27, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB
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Law: Exploring and Assessing Google’s Practices in Mobile, 12 EUR. COMPETITION J. 159 
(2016) (describing how Google’s Android platform came to have a dominant market 
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285 See, e.g., Contreras, Market, supra note 8, at 482 (suggesting the need for additional 
legal tools to ensure that patent pledges are enforceable on subsequent purchasers of patents); 
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This creates future risks of patent hold-up that are hard for a patent pledgor to 
eliminate. While under current leadership Tesla is extremely unlikely to engage 
in patent hold-up, for example, changes in the financial position of the company 
or its leadership could result in a subsequent change in patent strategy or 
divestiture of patent assets. The growth of the secondary market for patents, 
including a number of recent multimillion-dollar acquisitions of patent 
portfolios through merger, sale, or as part of bankruptcy proceedings, makes the 
limitations of pledges in the event of transfer a very real concern.286 The 
development of the License on Transfer (LOT) Network, which requires 
members to cross-license their patents to other members upon transfer of the 
patents to a patent assertion entity,287 is evidence of the fear that companies have 
of how patents may be used against them in the event of transfer. As of January 
2017 the LOT Network had over 100 members, including Google (the founder 
of the Network), Uber, Ford, GM, and SAP, and included more than half a
million patent assets.288 Recent data gathered by the LOT Network showed that 
since the inception of the Network members have divested themselves of over 
42,000 patent assets, some of which have ended up in the hands of patent 
assertion entities, indicating just how real the possibility of transfer is.289 The 
secondary market for patents in emerging technology areas, including new 
                                                                                                                     
Contreras, Patent, supra note 3, at 598–600; Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s
Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 261–
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ip-idUSKBN0K11AI20141223 [https://perma.cc/PMB8-9LK2] (detailing the sale of the more 
than 4,000 patents owned by Rockstar Consortium, which was formed from the $4.5 billion 
purchase of 6,000 Nortel Network Corp. patents in 2011 following its bankruptcy); Steve 
Lohr, On Google, FTC Set Rules of War Over Patents, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/05/technology/in-google-patent-case-ftc-set-rules-of-
engagement-for-battles.html [https://perma.cc/85WA-J2XW] (discussing Google’s purchase of 
Motorola, including patents that had been pledged to license on reasonable terms).
287 BELCHER & CASEY, supra note 5, at 14. 
288 See SEDDON, supra note 7. 
289 See Jack Ellis, LOT Network Can Look Back on a Bumper 2016 Thanks to Asian 
Subscriptions, IAM: BLOG (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=263b
3cc1-0052-4b2e-9385-09e483945dd5 [https://perma.cc/H424-WKNW] (looking at data on third 
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automotive and cloud computing technologies, is particularly active, with 
growing interest in such patents from patent assertion entities.290
Patent pledges can also be used in ways that enable patent pledgors to 
extract supranormal profits from the users of complementary technology.291
Where there are two or more technologies connected by an interface, for 
example, and their value standing alone is much less than their value when used 
together, a company that produces all of the components may seek to price one 
or some of the components at zero if they have a competitive advantage in 
selling, or extracting value from, the related component.292 This creates
opportunities to extract supranormal profits and can be used to foreclose 
competitors in the market for the zero-priced component(s).293
Google’s cloud computing strategies appear to have elements that resemble 
this type of pricing strategy at work.294 Google derives much of its revenue from 
proprietary rights in search algorithms and ad products that benefit from a large 
volume of Internet users.295 Not surprisingly, Google’s patent pledges and 
emphasis on open source are directed at technologies that facilitate free access 
to and use of the Internet, including the Android open-source operating system 
for mobile technologies.296 The fact that Google’s search engine and the 
Android platform are made freely available to consumers has encouraged broad 
adoption of these technologies by both consumers and application 
developers.297 Post-adoption, consumers and developers face a variety of 
switching costs that limit their willingness and ability to switch to another 
platform.298 As its market dominance has grown, Google has been accused of 
exploiting its dominant position in Internet search to favor its own applications 
                                                                                                                     
290 See Toshio Nakajima, IP Threats and Collaboration in the Auto Industry,
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1424 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:6
and to extract higher prices from advertisers and from manufacturers that want 
to install Google applications.299 Consumers are drawn to the free search 
technologies, but they end up paying a high price in terms of the information 
and attention they provide, advertisers pay a premium for access to this attention 
and information, and competitors complain of discrimination.300
Although in a world of perfect information and perfect rationality the 
potential users of the pledged technology should be able to anticipate the risks 
inherent in adopting pledged technology and limit their reliance accordingly, 
complete internalization of this risk is unlikely to occur for a variety of reasons.
The patent holder may have private information about its future technology 
plans and patenting behavior that allow for patent hold-up in ways that 
consumers and intermediate producers cannot anticipate. Early adopters of the 
technology may not bear the full cost or even the brunt of the cost of patent hold-
up or other opportunistic actions in the future, and economies of scale and 
network effects will push follow-on users to adopt the same technology. 
Information asymmetries between the pledgor and potential users of the 
technology, the relative concentration of benefits accruing to the patent holder 
and decentralized nature of the costs that might accrue to the public, combined 
with limited public information about alternative innovation pathways and the 
future costs of their current technology choices, will make it difficult for 
consumers and developers to predict and adjust to the costs of patent hold-up in 
advance. Moreover, it has been well documented that the allure of “free”
impacts consumer choice in ways that do not always align with the value they 
derive from alternatives.301 Free pricing distorts consumer decision-making in 
ways that may not be economically efficient, leaving them potentially worse off 
as they choose goods with hidden costs, adopt inferior technology, or make 
irrecoverable investments in technology choices based on short-term benefits 
from zero-pricing.302
                                                                                                                     
299 See, e.g., Thomas Catan & Amir Efrati, FTC Sharpens Google Probe, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 11, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240531119048238045765005440822
14566 [https://perma.cc/J2C5-N6S9] (discussing an FTC probe examining whether Google 
uses its dominant position to engage in practices such as giving preferential placement to its 
own goods and services in search results and unfairly using information collected by rivals);
Brody Mullins et al., Inside the U.S. Antitrust Probe of Google, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 19, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-u-s-antitrust-probe-of-google-1426793274 
[https://perma.cc/D3LW-36G5]. 
300 See, e.g., Rolfe Winkler, Mobile Alters Landscape Where Google Operates, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mobile-is-altering-the-landscape-where-
google-operates-1427414659 [https://perma.cc/A883-K8DT] (examining some of the costs 
associated with Google’s search dominance). See generally Barnett, Costs, supra note 2.
301 See, e.g., Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 528 (discussing the salience of free 
pricing and the ways in which it can distort consumer behavior); Newman, supra note 2, at 
179–80.
302 See Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 528. 
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2. Foreclosure of Competing Technologies
Patent hold-up is not the only source of costs from opportunistic use of 
patent pledges. Obtaining and making available patents in one area may be used 
strategically to foreclose alternative technology paths, standards, or platforms. 
By making patents covering a particular technology freely available, the cost of 
using this technology drops and the attractiveness of adopting this technology 
increases, often resulting in a decline in the profitability, and even the 
sustainability, of competing technologies.303
While there may be short-term social welfare gains in the form of reduced 
deadweight loss from making a nonrivalrous good and the patents that may 
cover it freely available, in the long run this strategic forfeiture of patent rights 
can result in reduced competition and the foreclosure of alternative, potentially 
superior, technologies.304
One of the earliest examples of patent pledges involved IBM’s efforts to 
encourage adoption of Linux, an open-source operating system for personal 
computers, servers, and many other hardware platforms.305 By 2005 IBM 
claimed to have spent over $1 billion in Linux development, culminating in one 
of its most visible contributions, the pledge to make 500 Linux-related patents 
freely available to the Linux community.306 While IBM’s patent pledges 
technically cover development and use of all open-source software that meets 
the Open Source Initiative definition of open source, the types of patents that it 
makes available and the definition of open-source software it provides are 
designed to promote Linux based software.307 Linux has relied for its success 
on the substantial corporate backing and patent pledge protection it received 
from companies such as IBM, and the success of Linux may well have come at 
the expense of viable alternative open-source operating systems that lack the 
same subsidies and protective patent umbrellas.308 It likely also crowded out 
                                                                                                                     
303 See Barnett, Host’s, supra note 14, at 1896; Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 523.
304 See, e.g., Barnett, Costs, supra note 2, at 7 (discussing ways in which zero-pricing 
may distort technology and content markets).
305 West, supra note 90, at 1268; see also IBM Pledges 500 U.S. Patents to Open Source 
in Support of Innovation and Open Standards, IBM (Jan. 11, 2005), https://www-03.ibm.com/
press/us/en/pressrelease/7473.wss [https://perma.cc/BZ37-WRPA] [hereinafter IBM Pledges]. 
306 IBM Statement of Non-Assertion of Named Patents Against OSS, IBM,
https://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/pledgedpatents.pdf [https://perma.cc/VM2W-5RTW];
David B. Yoffie & Mary Kwak, With Friends Like These: The Art of Managing 
Complementors, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 2006), https://hbr.org/2006/09/with-friends-like-these-
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307 See IBM Pledges, supra note 305.
308 See, e.g., Christopher Tozzi, Open Source History: Why Did Linux Succeed, VAR
GUY (Aug. 23, 2016), http://thevarguy.com/open-source-application-software-companies/
050415/open-source-history-why-did-linux-succeed [https://perma.cc/GF7Z-5VHM] (exploring 
why Linux succeeded whereas other similar attempts to build a free or open-source Unix-
like operating system kernel did not survive).
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alternative operating systems that could not compete in a zero-price 
environment.309
The strategic value of “free” patents, as well as the potential costs from their 
use, are particularly high in industries characterized by network effects and/or 
scale economies.310 Network effects refer to situations in which a good or 
service becomes more valuable the greater the number of consumers of that 
good or service.311 Economies of scale mean that the per unit price of making a 
good or providing a service falls as the production volume increases.312 Where 
there are economies of scale or network effects in the market, lowering the cost 
of the technology or otherwise making the technology choice more attractive to 
users can lead to large gains for the technology owner. Platforms tend to have 
both network effects and economies of scale. Companies stand to make large 
gains from lowering their prices to below a profitable level in order to attract 
users and developers, thus lowering costs and attracting even more users, and in 
the process driving competitors who cannot offer such low prices out of the 
market.313
In this context of platform competition there may be cost savings and value 
gains from having a single platform, but there are also significant potential 
social welfare costs. The highest quality platform may not be the one that is 
adopted, or the platform may fail to adapt to changing opportunities and 
conditions over time, participants may lose interest in innovating in platform 
technologies if the margins are too low, and there is no guarantee that the prices 
will stay low for long in a highly concentrated market.314
One area of particular concern for social welfare is the impact of free patents 
and related free pricing strategies on competition. Open patent wars can 
sometimes take on characteristics similar to predatory pricing schemes in the 
sense that patented technologies are offered royalty-free with the hope that 
competing technologies will remain more expensive, and thus less attractive, 
and ultimately unsustainable.315 Patent pledges can be used to signal that a 
                                                                                                                     
309 See Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 558 (discussing case of Wallace v. IBM, where 
the issue was whether provision of free software violated antitrust laws and the concern was 
that plaintiff could not compete with Linux).
310 See Barnett, Host’s, supra note 14, at 187478 (showing how strategic forfeiture of 
patent rights functions as a strategy for increasing market share in platform markets).
311 Id. at 1865. Telephones are a good example of network goods, since the more people 
who use phones, the more valuable a phone is to you. Id.
312 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 122, at 494.
313 Under antitrust law, a single firm may be found to engage in illegal predatory pricing 
if it offers a product at artificially low prices, the low prices force competitors out of the 
market, and then the company raises its prices above competitive market levels. See, e.g.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER 
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 49 (2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr
/legacy/2008/09/12/236681_chapter4.pdf [https://perma.cc/GW4Y-MEEX].
314 See, e.g., Barnett, Host’s, supra note 14, at 1869.
315 See Matt Wienberger, The Dark Side of the Cloud Price Wars Between Amazon, 
Google, and Microsoft, IT NEWS (July 18, 2014), https://www.itnews.com/article/2458446/
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particular technology platform will be lower cost and, because of the low cost, 
will have more users and therefore more developers, possibly resulting in the 
tipping of the market towards this platform choice and the demise of 
alternatives.316 Where there are switching costs, the ability of new platforms to 
enter and existing platforms to compete may be diminished.317
Some of these costs have emerged in the context of patent pledges covering 
internet based computing technologies. One example is Microsoft’s provision 
of a free browser, a move seemingly designed to increase barriers to entry in the 
market for PC-based operating systems and, arguably, to foreclose a competing 
browser, Netscape Navigator.318 Netscape, which did not have any robust ways 
of extracting revenue through complementary goods, could not compete with 
Microsoft’s zero-pricing strategy for its browser.319 Microsoft’s zero-pricing 
strategy, among other practices, became the subject of an antitrust law suit 
brought by the Department of Justice.320 Google’s strategy of promoting 
Android as the dominant open-source mobile device operation system also 
illustrates how promises to make intellectual property and the underlying 
technology free can potentially have exclusionary effects on competitor 
technologies.321 Android is an open-source operating system that “sits between 
hardware, applications, and [end] users.”322 Google has from the start promoted 
Android as “the first truly open and comprehensive platform for mobile devices”
and has offered Android to hardware manufacturers, and anybody else, for a 
zero-price and on open-source terms, and this open strategy accounts at least in 
part for Android’s market dominance.323 Google has also invested significant 
resources in acquiring patents to create a defensive patent portfolio designed to 
                                                                                                                     
cloud-computing/amazon-google-microsoft-cloud-price-wars-hurt-everyone.html
[https://perma.cc/94ST-DN3K] (discussing impact of price wars between large players in 
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different infrastructure clouds have different strengths and cater to different markets, but that 
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316 See Merges, supra note 106.
317 See id.
318 See Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 541. 
319 See Barnett, Costs, supra note 2, at 6–7 (examining Microsoft’s bundling of its 
operating system with a free browser, Internet Explorer, and the resulting negative impact 
on Netscape’s Navigator).
320 See Steve Lohr & Joel Brinkley, Pricing at Issue as U.S. Finishes Microsoft Case,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/06/business/pricing-at-issue-as-us-
finishes-microsoft-case.html [https://perma.cc/L9WF-K336] (“Microsoft decided to give away 
its browser software only to thwart the threat to its dominance posed by its main rivals in 
Internet software.”). See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, Microsoft’s Internet Exploration: 
Predatory or Competitive, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 29 (1999) (analyzing the case 
brought by the Department of Justice against Microsoft based on charges of predatory pricing 
and related actions).
321 See Edelman & Geradin, supra note 284, at 2–3; see also Gal & Rubinfeld, supra
note 2, at 542–44.
322 See Edelman & Geradin, supra note 284, at 4.
323 See id. at 1, 4.
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protect Android and has pledged many of its own patents to protecting Google 
open-source initiatives such as Android.324 Most Android devices are provided 
to consumers with Google Mobile Service (GMS) included, but including GMS 
entails moving from open-source Android to proprietary Google Play Service 
and underlying proprietary application programming interfaces (APIs).325
Manufacturers must enter into separate licenses to offer their devices 
bundled with GMS or the Google applications it includes, and these agreements 
include a number of restrictive terms that have the potential effect of limiting 
entry by competitors seeking to offer competing products and services, such as 
a competing search engine or competing applications.326
Offering Android devices without GMS has proven to be unsuccessful, as 
illustrated by the failure of mobile software firm Cyanogen with its “Google-
free” Android approach.327 Only Amazon has been ultimately successful in 
developing its own competing applications on Android (an “Android fork”), and 
only with difficulty and great expense.328 Google’s free internet search 
technologies and Android operating system have thus brought with them a 
variety of hidden costs and constraints on competition that have been the subject 
of competitor complaints and FTC investigations.329
In addition to foreclosing direct competitors, strategies involving the free 
pricing of patents and other intellectual property rights can negatively impact 
investments in complementary products and services.330 The ability to make 
some aspects of a technology system free while recouping money from other 
aspects can result in pricing of technologies that does not reflect their 
comparative values, as well as distorting incentives to invest in those 
technologies that are offered at a zero-price, with long-term consequences for 
                                                                                                                     
324 See Andrew Martonik, Google Pledges To Only Use Open-Source Related Patents 
Defensively, ANDROID CENT. (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.androidcentral.com/google-pledges-
only-use-open-source-related-patents-defensively [https://perma.cc/KQ5N-XUVB]; see also
Patents in the Service of Open Source, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/patents/opnpledge/ 
[https://perma.cc/MWP2-EGCF]. 
325 See Edelman & Geradin, supra note 284, at 5. 
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327 See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Amazon Fire Phone Review: Full of Gimmicks, Lacking 
Basics, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-fire-phone-review-
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Means Necessary, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 20, 2013), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2013/10/
googles-iron-grip-on-android-controlling-open-source-by-any-means-necessary/ 
[https://perma.cc/YWF4-GB9J] (discussing Amazon’s efforts to compete with its own 
applications for Android).
329 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google Agrees To Change Its Business 
Practices To Resolve FTC Competition Concerns in the Markets for Devices Like Smart 
Phones, Games and Tablets, and in Online Search (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2013/01/google-agrees-change-its-business-practices-resolve-ftc 
[https://perma.cc/RRH6-AWMJ].
330 See Barnett, Costs, supra note 2, at 18. 
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the evolution of this technology.331 The cost of zero-pricing on the quality of 
products has been documented in the on-line content industry, where efforts by 
large internet companies to make on-line content and mobile applications 
available for free have undermined the ability of high-quality content and 
application providers to compete.332 A related concern is that patent pledges 
could be used to promote open-source innovation systems that are not robust to 
market incentives, resulting in the selection of a system that will beat the 
proprietary alternative in the short run but will not be preferable or sustainable 
in the long run.333
3. Barriers to Entry
Patent pledges might also create entry barriers for startup companies that 
want to develop technology paths or engage in innovation strategies that diverge 
from those of interest to existing industry incumbents. The use of patent pledges 
can create barriers to entry by (a) decreasing the funding that can be procured 
and the revenue that can be gained from individual patents, (b) increasing the 
number of patents needed to compete, and (c) creating norms and expectations 
that certain types of technology should be available for a zero-price.
First, patent pledges and other defensive patent strategies are altering the 
functions that patents play in ways that may negatively impact the funding 
available to startup companies.334 Patents have traditionally been an important 
way for startup companies to attract venture capital funding335 and can also be 
                                                                                                                     
331 See Dietrich Volrath, There’s No Limit to Google’s Market Power, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
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used as ways of securing loans.336 Patent pledges and related strategies 
involving strategic forfeiture of intellectual property could lower valuations and 
lead to less funding for emerging companies. In addition, the defensive nature 
of patent pledges may make it more difficult and more costly for entrants to use 
patents to limit imitation or to engage in licensing, since any enforcement of 
their patents against large companies engaged in defensive patenting practices 
will result in loss of protection from patent pledges and a potential infringement 
claim.337
Second, companies may require larger patent portfolios in order to compete.
Patents increasingly seem to have more value as part of patent portfolios than 
they do standing alone.338 With a large patent portfolio, the likelihood that a 
competitor infringes one of your patents is high and the cost to them of figuring 
out whether they will is also high, thus creating a defensive shield for you.339
Large companies can use patent portfolios to enter into reciprocal cross-
licensing agreements with each other, either explicitly or implicitly through the 
use of reciprocal threats.340 They can also use their large patent portfolios and 
the threat of counter-suit to discourage patent challenges and deter patent 
infringement suits from small competitors.341 The growth of defensive patenting 
may give rise to the reverse of patent hold-up, creating problems of patent hold-
out that may be particularly detrimental to smaller companies.342
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In addition, patent pledges may increase the need for defensive patent 
portfolios as a way of encouraging technology adoption, adding to the cost of 
entry for competing technologies.343 Patent pledges provide protection to users 
of particular technology paths, creating a defensive umbrella for these users.344
This is the strategy that IBM has used first to establish Linux as an industry-
standard operating system and now to attract developers and users to 
OpenStack, an open-source cloud operating system. A potential entrant 
interested in pursuing a divergent technology may be unable to encourage 
adoption of this technology without the protection that a defensive patent 
portfolio affords.345 Microsoft now explicitly promises to defend users of its 
Azure cloud-computing platform, including the open-source software sold on 
Azure, and has also offered customers who face infringement suits for the use 
of Azure the aid of 10,000 Microsoft patents to use in their defense.346
But obtaining a patent portfolio, particularly one that will then be made 
available for free, could be prohibitively expensive for a startup company. The 
entry barriers will be most important for startup companies interested in offering 
competing stand-alone technology platforms, since making large patent 
portfolios available for free can be an important but also costly way of tipping 
the market towards adoption of the patent holder’s preferred platform.347
Patent pledges may also be used to set norms and expectations about the 
price of intellectual content and technologies. The competition over definitions 
of “open” through the use of pledges, as discussed in Part II, is used to shape 
the structure of emerging markets by setting consumer expectations about what 
technologies they pay for and what technologies they can expect to get for free. 
This can foreclose the development of new technologies where people are 
primed to expect such technologies for free.348 Consumers expect mobile phone 
applications to have a zero-price, for example, making it difficult for developers 
of applications that charge a fee to survive even where the information and 
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attention costs of zero-priced applications are much higher than the fee.349 This 
zero-pricing norm deters entry by developers of new applications that do not 
have other ways of making money from their applications.350 More generally, 
larger established companies can afford to engage in strategies that sacrifice 
revenues to encourage adoption of their technology, and often benefit from free 
patents and lower priced technologies through higher prices in complementary 
products, allowing them to flourish on a platform of “free” patents while 
discouraging entry and limiting competition.351 Market data shows a clear 
pairing of zero-priced bundling strategies and market concentration in 
“commodified” content markets, for example.352
In summary, while patent pledges can be used in ways that improve social 
welfare, they can also be exploited in ways that are socially costly. These costs 
include paying higher prices for complementary goods, paying future high 
prices for currently free technology, and foreclosure of alternative technologies.
Disentangling those patent pledges that are a natural part of platform 
competition from those that resemble anticompetitive predatory pricing 
strategies may be difficult without careful attention to the market context and 
the conduct of patent pledgors over time. Limitations in the existing legal 
framework, the ability of market participants to vary their behavior in response 
to rule changes, and limitations in the information available to regulators, make 
it difficult to sort the beneficial uses from the socially costly uses in advance 
through careful rule design.353 The danger of opportunistic use of pledges 
undermines the benefits that might otherwise be obtained from some types of 
patent pledges by reducing the level of trust needed to make them work and by 
increasing the uncertainty that the pledges will be honored. This results in an 
additional layer of costs, as some socially beneficial uses of patent pledges may 
be foregone. 
Thus, while patent pledges do offer new and beneficial ways of patent 
sharing, this Part IV has shown that there are also potential costs associated with 
the opportunistic use of patent pledges that should not be ignored. Part V shows 
how patent pledges may fall through the cracks of the existing legal framework 
in ways that allow for opportunistic use of patent pledges. It then suggests ways 
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in which equity can be used within patent law to specifically target and deter 
opportunistic uses of pledges in order to reap the benefits and mitigate the costs 
of patent pledges. The need to sort beneficial from socially costly uses of 
pledges drives the proposal for greater use of equity made in Part V.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR PATENT POLICY
“All promise outruns performance.”
–Ralph Waldo Emerson354
Patent pledges are part of a growing trend toward private tailoring of patent 
rights designed to accommodate changing paradigms of innovation and changes 
in patterns of patent use in ways that are not adequately addressed within the 
existing legal framework.355 Part IV illustrated some of the ways in which patent 
pledges seemingly directed at promoting open and collaborative innovation 
might also create opportunities for exploiting proprietary positions and 
foreclosing competition—even if they were not initially made with the intent to 
do so. This concluding section considers the implications of patent pledges for 
patent law and policy. It begins with the limits of the current law to respond to 
the risks and protect the benefits offered by patent pledges and then considers 
ways of responding to the limits in order to mitigate socially costly use of patent 
pledges.
A. Revealing Limits in the Law 
“It is easy to make promises - it is hard work to keep them.”
–Boris Johnson356
Although often brief and simply written, patent pledges raise complicated 
legal issues regarding the interpretation, scope, and enforceability of the 
pledges.357 Patent pledges do not fall neatly under any single body of law, and 
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357 See Contreras, Market, supra note 8, at 482–85 (arguing that current legal theories 
do not support the enforcement of pledges, and suggesting a market reliance theory as a new 
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questions about whether and how to regulate what are essentially promises to 
make limited licenses available for free are not easily answered.
At first glance, the pledges might seem to fall within the ambit of contract 
law, since they are private promises intended to induce actions by at least some 
of the recipients of the promise. Most of the patent pledges, however, especially 
those made outside of a formal standard-setting process, lack the elements of 
mutuality and bargained-for exchange required to form a legally binding 
contract.358 They are unilateral promises made to the public at large, with no 
return obligation and often with no further communication with or even 
knowledge of those who may avail themselves of the benefits of the pledge.359
In addition, many of the patent pledges include vague and ambiguous language 
and leave out important details about the scope and duration of the promise, 
providing an additional barrier to any contract claim.360
The legal doctrines most helpful to someone who wants to rely upon the 
promises are those of promissory estoppel and equitable estoppel, both equitable 
doctrines that allow some consideration of the context within which the 
promises were made and relied upon.361 Promissory estoppel and equitable 
estoppel lend themselves to situations in which a promise is made, but not 
fulfilled, to the detriment of the recipient(s) of the promise.362
Promissory estoppel theories offer an alternative to the bargained-for-
exchange paradigm that lies at the heart of contract law, focusing instead on a 
reliance-inducing promise.363 Patent pledges are promises designed to 
encourage the public to make investments and decisions based on the promise, 
and the pledgors no doubt intend to encourage that reliance.364 Allowing the 
patent pledgor to go back on the pledge could harm the parties who relied on the 
pledge.365 Equitable estoppel theories, in contrast to promissory estoppel, focus 
on deceptive conduct by the promisor.366 While these equitable doctrines 
capture aspects of at least some patent pledges, their reach is inadequate and 
their successful application unpredictable.367 The current estoppel doctrines in 
both contract law and patent law are limited to promises made by the promisor 
to a particular actor or group of actors in a defined relationship with the 
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360 Id. at 514–16 (providing an in-depth analysis of the limits of contract law to provide 
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362 See Contreras, Market, supra note 8, at 518.
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promisor, and it is hard to extend these theories in their current forms to 
situations where either the relationship or the promise elements or both are 
attenuated.368 The need to prove actual, reasonable reliance is a further hurdle 
in bringing either a promissory estoppel or an equitable estoppel claim.369 In 
addition to challenges in satisfying the elements for a contract, promissory 
estoppel, or equitable estoppel claim, there are two additional reasons to look 
elsewhere for ways of regulating patent pledges.
First, the costs discussed in Part IV involve risks to social welfare rather 
than simply focusing on harms to the individual parties involved, suggesting the 
need for alternative ways of intervening in and regulating patent pledges that 
take the public interest into account. Second, the focus of these doctrines on a 
specific bargain between parties does not adequately capture the indirect costs 
associated with opportunistic use of pledges, some of which were discussed in 
Part IV.
The potential consequences of patent pledges for competition could bring 
them within the ambit of antitrust law, but current antitrust law is not equipped 
to address the challenges that patent pledges raise for competition and 
innovation.370 The limits of antitrust law to address some of the negative effects 
of zero-pricing strategies, including zero-pricing of intellectual property, on 
competition have already been noted in the literature.371 Zero-pricing of goods 
and services leads to problems in defining markets and identifying 
anticompetitive harms. In addition, even without the difficulties that a zero-price 
strategy creates for antitrust analysis, the requirements for bringing an antitrust 
claim will be too hard to satisfy in the patent pledge context.372 In order to bring 
an antitrust claim against a company that has made a patent pledge that could 
negatively impact competition, it is necessary to show either coordination 
among competitors or some conduct that approaches monopolization.373 Offers 
to make patents freely available, whether in the context of community licensing 
approaches such as open-source software licenses374 or open patent 
agreements,375 or even more so where the pledgor is an individual entity making 
the offer to the public at large, generally lack the traditional elements that form 
the basis for antitrust claims. 
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Where antitrust policymakers have paid attention to patent pledges, they 
have confined their intervention to situations of patent hold-up or potential 
patent hold-up in the context of industry wide formal standard-setting 
processes.376 They have intervened where a party fails to honor its obligations 
to license on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms or should 
have made a FRAND pledge but fails to do so and subsequently seeks to extract 
exorbitant rents on a patent essential to the use of the adopted standard.377 Even 
in this limited context, antitrust scrutiny has mostly focused on high-profile 
examples of patent hold-up, such as Motorola Mobility’s assertion of patents 
covering standards essential to mobile communication technologies against 
Microsoft and Apple, with Google joining the fight after acquiring Motorola 
Mobility.378
Antitrust authorities have been careful to limit their intervention in response 
to patent pledges to situations of patent hold-up using standard-essential patents 
subject to FRAND obligations.379 Moreover, some antitrust authorities have 
expressed concern about the applicability of antitrust to address even these 
instances of patent hold-up, suggesting that contract and patent law are better 
suited to the job.380 Concerns associated with the use of antitrust laws in these 
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379 See, e.g., Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Proper Role of Antitrust 
in Addressing Patent Hold-Up, 11 ANTITRUST L. 11, 13 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
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addressing_patent_hold.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9ZW-H3L8] (“For example, Commissioner 
Wright has stated that ‘antitrust laws are not well suited to govern contract disputes between 
private parties in light of remedies available under contract or patent law.’”).
380 See id.; see also MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN, STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER 
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN IN THE MATTER OF ROBERT BOSCH GMBH 2–3 (2012), 
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settings include increasing the likelihood of reverse hold-up by firms using 
standard essential patents, reducing the flexibility of private parties in setting 
royalties, discouraging participation in standard setting, and reducing incentives 
to make innovations that may become integrated into standards.381
Antitrust agencies have also explored alternative intellectual property 
arrangements, such as covenants not to sue and cross-licensing arrangements, in 
the context of agency guidelines, and these guidelines encompass unilateral 
offers of royalty-free cross-licensing or patent nonassertion.382 As discussed in 
Part II, however, patent pledges have a unique combination of characteristics 
that may not have been contemplated when these agency guidelines were 
developed, and the guidelines say little about the use, or misuse, of patent 
pledges. 
In sum, antitrust authorities most likely lack both the ability, given the 
existing law, and the willingness to move beyond these situations of coordinated 
action among competitors to regulate the subtle ways in which companies 
making unilateral patent pledges might be negatively impacting competition. 
This limited reach of antitrust law may indeed be one of the attractions of 
decentralized forms of patent pledges for the companies that are making them. 
This leaves patent law as a way of responding to the challenges that patent 
pledges may create. But patent law in its current form does not provide an 
effective way of regulating and enforcing patent pledges and lacks the tools for 
discriminating between socially beneficial uses of pledges and socially costly 
uses of pledges. Patent law is designed to provide the patent owner with the right 
to exclude others from use of patented technology. Statutory and common law 
have both evolved around this model of the exclusive rights of the patent holder, 
using appropriability to reward discovery with the underlying goal of promoting 
innovation. Patent holders control third party uses of their patents through 
licensing and assignment of rights to specified users. Patent pledges seek to turn 
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this statutory model of exclusion on its head, focusing instead on privately 
tailored means for providing generalized access to patents. Each pledge provides 
an individually tailored way of encouraging generalized access, varying both in 
the specificity of the terms and in the scope of the promise. Patent pledges must 
rely on existing law for their enforcement, but there are no mechanisms within 
patent law for recognizing and enforcing these kinds of generalized promises to 
share. Equitable defenses to patent infringement claims such as laches and 
equitable estoppel, at least in their current forms, rely too heavily on proof of a 
direct relationship or communication between the patent holder and the infringer 
upon which the infringer reasonably relied. Of even more concern, patent law 
does not provide a mechanism for ensuring that the patent pledge will follow 
the patent if it is assigned to a new owner or pulled into a bankruptcy 
proceeding.383 Indeed, patent law does not even provide a mechanism for 
keeping track of which patent pledges have been made or an effective way of 
putting the public on notice where patents have been encumbered by patent 
pledges.384
B. Expanding Role of Equity in Response
“[A]nd this is the office of equity, to support and protect the common law 
from shifts and crafty contrivances against the justice of the law.”
-Justice Story385
Patent pledges rest on an unstable legal footing, and the lack of legal tools 
for regulating how patent pledges are used, and potentially misused, creates 
opportunities for some patent holders to exploit patent pledges in ways that 
create social costs. The ability to respond to these potential costs ex ante,
through a change in statutory law, is limited by—among other things—the 
difficulty of predicting in advance when, where, and how pledges will be used 
in ways that create social costs. In this concluding Part I suggest that the greater 
use of equitable modes of decision-making within patent law can be used to 
curtail the costs of opportunism discussed in Part IV without the need to 
anticipate the forms and consequences of patent pledges in advance or the need 
to amend patent laws. I propose a very specific use of equity, one that is 
narrowly tailored to a specific problem—the exploitation of limitations in the 
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legal framework governing patent pledges along with private information to act 
opportunistically in ways that generate social costs.
While equity evades precise definition, it can be understood at a broad level 
as “the means by which a system of law balances out the need for certainty in 
rule-making with the need to achieve fair results in individual 
circumstances . . . equity ‘mitigates the rigor of the common law’ so that the 
letter of the law is not applied in so strict a way that it may cause injustice in 
individual cases.”386 The role of equity in U.S. law has a long and complex 
history,387 and the merits and function(s) of equity are subject to debate, but at 
a practical level equity provides courts with a set of principles, procedures, and 
remedies designed to mitigate harsh or unfair effects resulting from the strict 
application of any particular legal rule. As the Supreme Court has recently re-
affirmed in the case of eBay v. MercExchange, traditional principles of equity 
apply to patent disputes just as they do to other legal disputes.388
Courts employ a number of equitable doctrines in patent law disputes, and 
it is these doctrines that I draw on in fashioning a response to the potential costs 
that patent pledges could be used to create. 
In Part IV I identified three types of costs that arise largely from 
opportunistic behavior by private patent holders who exploit the limitations of 
the legal framework in ways that are difficult to predict and address through rule 
change—enhanced opportunities for patent hold-up, foreclosure of alternative 
technology paths, and use of pledges to create entry barriers.
These costs disturb the stable relationships that patent pledges might 
otherwise support between patent owners and users of the patented inventions.
In this Part V I borrow from other areas of law in which such opportunism 
occurs to apply Professor Henry Smith’s “safety valve” theory of equity to 
patent law. I use this theoretical framework to show how equitable modes of 
decision-making within patent law can be used to mitigate some of the potential 
costs of pledges while preserving their benefits. I begin by summarizing this 
“safety valve” theory of equity and then show how this approach could be 
fashioned into a response to potential costs of patent pledges.
1. Smith’s “Safety Valve” Theory of Equity
Professor Smith has described equity as a “private law solution to 
opportunism.”389 He defines opportunism as “behavior that is technically legal 
but done with a view to securing unintended benefits from the system, and these 
benefits are usually smaller than the costs they impose on others.”390 It 
encompasses “behavior that is undesirable but that cannot be cost-effectively 
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captured–defined, detected, and deterred–by explicit ex ante rulemaking.”391
Opportunities for this kind of opportunism are created, Professor Smith argues,
through exploitation of the modular nature of property rights—or in this case, 
patent rights—by actors who have too much information that they use to get 
around the intentions of existing rules.392 Equitable modes of decision-making 
within the law are ideally suited, he suggests, to deal with this kind of 
opportunism and can be used to increase the stability and effectiveness of legal 
rules.393 The use of equitable decision-making by courts can strengthen the 
operation of law by acting as “a second-order safety valve” to address “hard-to-
foresee problems that disturb the stable relationships between activities” where 
law fails owing to its generality.394
In practice, equitable decision-making by the court takes the form of 
applying a set of legal principles that supplement rules of law where application 
of the rules leads to outcomes that are harsh and unfair. Equity provides courts 
with a mechanism for applying these principles to determine the effects of a 
legal claim in situations where the strict application of the rules of law would 
lead to injustice. Using the functional account of equity described above, this 
approach allows courts to address the types of opportunistic behavior that cannot 
be easily addressed in advance through law or contract. “Not coincidentally, 
[opportunism] often violates moral norms, which are incorporated into the ex 
post principles that deal with opportunism.”395 Many of the principles take the 
form of simple maxims that deal with the conduct of parties, once that conduct 
has occurred, within the specific context of the conduct.396 These maxims 
include the following, selected here for their potential relevance to the 
challenges that patent pledges pose: (a) equity follows the law—it applies only 
where application of legal rules is inadequate; (b) equity acts in personam, not 
in rem; (c) equity will not allow a wrongdoer to profit from his or her own 
wrong; (d) equity regards substance rather than form; (e) equity imputes an 
intent to fulfill an obligation; (f) he or she who seeks equity must do equity; and 
(g) he or she who comes into equity must come with clean hands.397 These 
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principles, and the remedies that can follow, can be used to address behavior ex
post where it undermines the intended effect of legal rules that have, of 
necessity, been designed ex ante.398 Knowing that equity would operate after 
the fact would influence the choices that actors make beforehand as well as 
mitigating the costs associated with opportunistic behavior when it occurs.
2. Application to Patent Law
Professor Smith’s functional approach to equity as a second-order safety 
valve for law has direct application to the potential problems that patent pledges 
can create given the incomplete legal framework that governs them. Patent 
pledges are privately tailored promises to the public. They take a variety of 
different forms and encourage a variety of different actions on the part of entities 
and individuals. The forms that they take and the ways in which they are, or 
might be, used opportunistically are hard for rule makers to predict and address 
ex ante. Legitimate uses of patent pledges as normal parts of competition or to 
encourage adoption of socially beneficial technologies may be impossible to 
define and disentangle from opportunistic uses that entail social costs without 
reference to actual intent, conduct, and context. In contrast to the challenges of 
ex ante rule design, it will be much less difficult to spot and address 
opportunistic uses, and abuses, of patent pledges after the conduct has occurred. 
The context in which patent pledges are made, as well as the context surrounding 
subsequent uses of the patented technology and patents, will be important in 
evaluating whether the patent pledge has been used in ways that implicate 
equitable intervention in a later patent infringement or related legal claim. The 
knowledge that courts will be able to spot and react to bad behavior will have 
the effect of deterring at least some of this behavior ex ante. Reduction in the 
risks associated with patent pledges will increase the benefits from non-
opportunistic uses of patent pledges.
Whether the actions of the patent holder are inconsistent with reasonable 
interpretations of the pledge and reasonable beliefs about the subsequent use of 
technology covered by the patent(s) owned by the pledgor can provide a starting 
point for courts charged with enforcing patents that were the subject of patent 
pledges. The pledges themselves often utilize language drawn from equitable 
concepts, particularly the use of “good faith” and reliance on justifications of 
fairness, in place of precise terms and conditions.
Judges should be able to draw on corresponding equitable modes of 
decision-making to ensure that good faith and fairness governs the interpretation 
and enforcement of these promises. Going back to the maxims listed above, 
equity fills in the gaps in the law, applying—as is the case with patent pledges—
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where application of the legal rules is inadequate. It takes the conduct and the 
specific context within which such conduct occurs into account (acting in 
personam) to ensure that the wrongdoer does not profit and comes with clean 
hands. It pays attention to the substance rather than the form of the promise and 
imputes intent to fulfill the reasonable obligations attached to the promise, 
supporting relationships that rely on trust and reputation. The ability to take 
intent into account has the additional benefit of allowing judges to distinguish 
between practices that may have legitimate objectives, such as market 
penetration, and practices that have anticompetitive objectives, such as 
predatory foreclosure of competing technologies.399
The use of equitable principles to police opportunism in the use of patent 
pledges does not require significant changes to existing patent law doctrine. The 
general principles of equity apply to patent law just as they do to other bodies 
of law.400 Moreover, patent law already explicitly incorporates a variety of 
equitable doctrines that provide courts with limited discretion to interject 
external standards of fairness and the public interest into their deliberations. 
Equity enters into patent cases in at least two main ways: (a) determinations of 
equitable remedies, or remedies that are not money damages, such as injunctive 
relief, and (b) equitable defenses, such as equitable estoppel, laches, patent 
misuse, and inequitable conduct or the broader concept of unclean hands.401
This range of opportunities for equitable decision-making within patent law 
means that instead of introducing entirely new concepts into patent law, courts 
can draw expansively on existing equitable doctrines to mitigate the three types 
of costs discussed above—patent hold-up, foreclosure of alternative technology 
paths, and strategic use of pledges to deter entry. The array of equity tools allows 
courts to tailor their response to the nature of the costly behavior, and, where 
necessary, to incorporate considerations of the public interest into their decision-
making. Below I provide a few examples of how equitable doctrines might be
used to respond to these three types of costly behaviors.
First, with regard to problems of patent hold-up, the costs arise when 
technology choices are made by the public or some subgroup based on 
reasonable assumptions that the patent pledgor will not enforce its patents or 
some specified subgroup of its patents against these users for their particular 
uses, there are sunk costs associated with changing their technology choice, and 
the patent owner exploits these sunk costs to extract more than reasonable 
royalties from the technology users either directly or indirectly through 
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increased costs to manufacturers who supply the patented technology.402 I
suggest that patent pledges that promise to keep particular technology paths 
open should be enforced in a manner consistent with the spirit of these promises, 
and in ways that protect reasonable reliance interests of the recipients of the 
patent pledge, through an expansion of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Under 
existing doctrine, to establish equitable estoppel as a defense to patent 
infringement, the alleged infringer must show: (a) misleading statements or 
conduct, (b) action in reasonable reliance on those statements or such conduct, 
and (c) resulting prejudice to the alleged infringer.403 The missing link in the 
patent pledge context is the first element, which would seem to require a direct 
relationship between the pledgor and the party relying on the pledge, misleading 
conduct or statements directed at the alleged infringer. To be useful in the patent 
pledge context, the pledge itself, made to the public at large, would have to be 
sufficient as the misleading statement or conduct, and the requirement of a direct 
relationship would have to be relaxed.
Concerns about market reliance on promises to make patents covering 
standards available have already led to several proposals for broadening 
estoppel concepts in patent law. Professors Merges and Kuhn propose an 
estoppel doctrine for standards, extending equitable estoppel to protect the 
reliance interests of the public in the use of patented industry standards.404
Professor Contreras focuses on promissory estoppel rather than equitable 
estoppel, proposing a fraud-on-the-market theory for justifying the equitable 
doctrine of patent unenforceability as a remedy for deceptive conduct in the 
context of standard setting.405 Under this proposal, knowing that the market will 
rely on the promise is enough to establish the link between the pledgor and the 
potential infringer.406 In contrast to these specific proposals for modifying 
equitable and promissory estoppel to encompass attenuated forms of reasonable 
reliance, the approach to equity I advocate in this Article would allow courts to 
focus on the behavior of the patent pledgor, examining whether the promisor 
was behaving opportunistically in ways that unfairly exploit the public.
Construing equitable estoppel in this way, courts would have the ability to refuse 
to allow a patent pledgor to take a later position with regards to patent 
enforcement that is inconsistent with their earlier position regarding open 
innovation and use of shared technology where there is public harm in doing so.
Areas where broader use of equitable estoppel may be particularly useful in 
addressing costs of hold-up include situations where patent pledgors are acting 
to support de facto standards in ways that create the potential for patent hold-up
once the standards are adopted. By promoting adoption of a particular 
                                                                                                                     
402 See Contreras, Equity, supra note 277, at 12.
403 See, e.g., A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992).
404 See Merges & Kuhn, supra note 278, at 21–27 (examining patent hold-up problems 
in contexts of standards). 
405 See Contreras, Market, supra note 8, at 538–55. 
406 Id. at 542–43.
1444 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:6
technology as an industry standard, patent pledges provide mechanisms for 
creating or reinforcing de facto standards. The pledges operate as private efforts 
to engage in standardization outside of a formal standard-setting process, and 
therefore outside of a system that includes industry participation and procedural 
safeguards. The same considerations that are informing FTC, DOJ, and USPTO 
guidelines regarding the enforcement of FRAND patents should be used in this 
context of de facto standard setting, but courts need to rely on broader concepts 
of equitable estoppel to constrain behavior where formal membership rules and 
agreements are absent. Choices between standards become even more 
complicated, and important, in situations of platform competition. Many of the 
most significant patent pledges, judged in terms of potential industry impact, 
involve pledges that influence the development and adoption of a platform 
technology as an industry standard.407
In the context of the examples discussed in Part III, consider a hypothetical 
in which a manufacturer of hydrogen-fueled cars that has made a collection of 
patents available to encourage adoption of its hydrogen car technology later 
approaches a car maker who has adopted this patented technology and asserts 
several closely related patents in the same family as pledged patents that cover 
slight improvements on the existing technology. Under an expanded doctrine of 
equitable estoppel, courts would be able to consider: (a) whether the hydrogen 
car manufacturer’s initial pledge was made in such a way as to mislead the 
public about continued free access to the patented technology, including not just 
pledged patents but also any other patents owned by the hydrogen car 
manufacturer that are needed to use the technology, (b) whether adopters made 
investments in reasonable reliance on the pledge—directly or indirectly through 
market adoption of the technology as a standard by those relying on the pledge, 
and (c) the extent of harm to adopters from allowing the hydrogen car 
manufacturer to enforce its patents. Courts could use these considerations to 
determine whether the patents can be enforced against the technology adopters 
and, if so, whether injunctive relief should be available.
As a second hypothetical example, suppose that Tesla’s or Toyota’s pledged 
patents are later acquired by a patent assertion entity that seeks to enforce the 
patent against adopters of the pledged patented technology. Antitrust law has 
been used quite effectively to address the problem of successors to patents 
pledged as part of standard setting. Starting with a case brought in 2008 against 
Negotiated Data Solutions, LLC, the Federal Trade Commission has applied 
Section 5 of the FTC Act, which protects against “unfair methods of 
competition,” to limit the assertion of patents licensed for use as part of industry 
standards by a subsequent owner of the patents seeking to renege on the 
license.408 Antitrust law may not be as effective in addressing the problem of 
                                                                                                                     
407 See Contreras, Market, supra note 8, at 486–90.
408 See, e.g., In the Matter of Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/051-0094/negotiated-data-solutions-
llc-matter [https://perma.cc/X324-EQP7] (last updated Sept. 23, 2008); see also FED. TRADE 
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successors outside of formal standard setting, however, particularly where the 
patent pledge has questionable legal enforceability to start with and where the 
impact on competition is less clear. In these cases, parties may need to rely on 
equitable estoppel as well. While equitable estoppel might apply to limit the 
original pledgor’s enforcement of its patents, it is important to the technology 
adopters that this doctrine extend to subsequent acquirers of the pledged 
patent(s). In prior cases the courts have been willing to extend the defense of 
equitable estoppel to assignees of a patent, holding that conduct by prior owners
can give rise to an equitable estoppel defense.409 In a recent case the Federal 
Circuit allowed equitable estoppel as a defense to an assignee nonpracticing 
entity where the prior patent owner had a business relationship with the alleged 
infringer.410
These decisions are consistent with the use of equity to limit opportunistic 
patent use by the assignees of pledged patents,411 but the doctrine needs to 
stretch further to encompass situations in which the only relationship between 
the prior patent owner and the patent users is the patent pledge.
Second, with respect to foreclosure of competing technologies, courts need 
to be wary of intervening in legitimate competition, including competitive 
lowering of price, but at the same time need the tools to respond to conditions 
that harm competition. While it may be difficult to disentangle legitimate 
competition from anticompetitive behavior, courts should have the ability to 
examine the intent and the effects of patent pledges ex post, seeking to identify 
areas where patents may be used in nontraditional ways to thwart competition 
among alternative systems of open innovation. As a starting point, equitable 
estoppel should apply broadly to ensure that where a technology provider 
achieves market dominance by promising to make its patents covering this 
technology available for free, its promises are rigorously enforced and follow 
                                                                                                                     
COMM’N, STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF NEGOTIATED 
DATA SOLUTIONS LLC, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/01/080122
statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD5U-RLSK] (complaint alleged that N-Data reneged on a prior 
licensing commitment to a standard-setting body and was therefore able to increase the price 
of a widely used technology by consumers, FTC held that this was conduct in violation of 
Section 5 of the FTC Act); Contreras, Patent, supra note 3, at 598–99.
409 See, e.g., High Point Sarl v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 817 F.3d 1325, 1326, 1331 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016). Equitable estoppel is “a license to use the invention that extends throughout the 
life of the patent.” SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 807
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Radio Sys. Corp. v. Lalor, 709 F.3d 1124, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Our precedent confirms 
that equitable estoppel applies to successors-in-interest where privity has been established.”
(citing Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 839 F.2d 1544, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1988))). 
410 See, e.g., High Point Sarl, 817 F.3d at 1331.
411 While equitable estoppel seems like a better fit for the types of patent hold-up
problems that patent pledges might give rise to, an analogy can also be drawn between what 
could be viewed as a form of patent pledge estoppel and file wrapper estoppel, which 
prevents the patentee from reclaiming content they have given up during prosecution of the 
patent.
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the patents in the event they are assigned to new owners. This would limit the 
predatory pricing aspects of patent pledges by restricting the ability of the patent 
pledgor to enforce its patents, or perhaps even subsequent patents within the 
same family or covering the same technology, after driving competition out of 
the market.
Where it is clear that the patent pledge is being used solely or primarily to 
drive a competing technology out of the market, the patent pledgor’s ability to 
extract rents from patents covering complementary goods or services should 
also be subject to scrutiny by the courts, with the public interest in access 
weighing against injunctions and limiting monetary damages. Here, avenues for 
finding patent misuse out of strategic patent nonuse may be used to create the 
appropriate balance between respecting private orderings and promoting 
competition. Findings of patent misuse could limit the defensive aspect of patent 
pledges by making them unenforceable even against those bringing a return 
patent suit. This would require an expansion of the patent misuse doctrine, 
which recent Federal Circuit decisions have construed narrowly,412 to 
encompass situations in which the patentee is extracting market benefits beyond 
the scope of the patent in ways other than through restricting access to that 
patent.
Drawing again from the cases discussed in Part III, suppose, for example, 
that a dominant cloud computing platform provider makes patent pledges 
covering a particular cloud technology available royalty-free in order to 
foreclose competition by smaller cloud computing providers that rely on 
charging for use of their proprietary cloud technology. By lowering the price of 
competing technology to zero, this large industry incumbent could drive smaller 
competitors out of the market. This would leave the large incumbent with the 
chance to increase prices for cloud computing technology later and with the 
ability to recoup costs through charging relatively higher prices for applications 
that work with the “free” cloud platform. In this example courts should be able 
to use an expanded approach to patent misuse to respond to what is essentially 
predatory patent pricing by limiting the pledgor’s ability to directly or indirectly 
increase the price of its cloud technology later. They should also be able to take 
the incumbent’s efforts to deter competition into account when determining 
injunctive relief and monetary damages for enforcement of the incumbent’s
patents covering complementary goods or services.
The third type of cost is where patent pledges are used deliberately to create 
entry barriers for competing technologies. This analysis overlaps with the use 
                                                                                                                     
412 See, e.g., Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (holding that a patent pool created by two companies that suppressed one of the 
two competing patented technologies did not constitute patent misuse, because a claim of 
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of pledges to foreclose competing technologies discussed above, but focuses on 
the negative impact on potential entrants rather than existing competitors. Some 
uses of pledges may create entry barriers inadvertently, but here I focus on 
deliberate efforts to discourage entry through the use of patent pledges. Patent 
pledges can be used to privilege some technology platforms over others. By 
promoting the protections made available to users of Linux, for example, IBM 
could make it more difficult for alternative competing open-source providers to 
flourish. Google could use its market power to shape notions of what types of 
technology should be free and what proprietary, potentially limiting entry of 
companies in areas where they would have to combat norms and expectations 
of free access to charge for their new technologies. Ford may seek to lower the 
cost of existing technology for hybrid cars enough to deter consumers from 
exploring new clean technologies.
Courts will have limited (if any) options to intervene in patent pledge 
decisions simply on the grounds that the pledges create entry barriers, but they 
may have the ability to apply equitable doctrines to limit the availability of 
injunctive relief and interject additional reasonableness considerations into 
monetary damages calculations where pledges are used strategically to deter 
entry. The courts could ensure that the spirit of promises to make technology 
platforms available for free are preserved, and they could also limit the bite of 
the defensive aspects of pledges where they are used to discourage alternative 
technologies.
VI. CONCLUSION
“There’s no such thing as a free lunch.”
–Milton Friedman413
Patent owners, including some of the world’s largest patent holders and 
most innovative companies, are pledging to share their patents for free. These 
patent pledgors are making unilateral promises not to assert their patents in a 
variety of ways that are promoted as mechanisms for supporting socially 
beneficial open innovation. While patent pledges may indeed provide useful 
mechanisms for addressing challenges that patents create for open systems of 
innovation, this Article has shown that they are not always welfare promoting. 
Costs arise where patent holders exploit limitations in the legal framework 
governing patent pledges along with private information about their intellectual 
property and business strategies to act opportunistically. 
The Article has shown that patent pledges can create hidden costs for 
innovation that the law is not currently equipped to deal with, and has suggested 
the difficulties of responding to these costs through ex ante rule change. While 
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the Article concludes that there’s no such thing as a free patent,414 however, it 
also suggests a way of mitigating the costs. As patent pledges, along with other 
arrangements involving a private reordering of patent rights, continue to 
increase in size and scope, equitable doctrines that are narrowly tailored to 
address opportunism can and should be used as mechanisms for mitigating costs 
and protecting the public interest. Broader use of existing equitable doctrines 
within patent law to address the opportunistic use of patent pledges can provide 
courts with limited flexibility to respond to the ways in which opportunistic uses 
of patent pledges may create individual unfairness or harm the public interest.
In this way we can reap the benefits and limit the costs of “free” patents. 
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